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On a plaque near the front entrance of the main 
office of A. S. Campbell Company are these words: 
To visitors on business we realize your time is 
valuable. 
If you are kept waiting longer than to you appears 
reasonable , 
Do not hesitate to ask the information clerk for a 
report. 
Our suppliers are as necessary to us as our 
customers. 
N.C.Raymond 
President 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM AND THE. PURPOSE 
The basic tenets behind any company policy must 
embody human understanding and mutual cooperation. 
This thesis will attempt to show the need for such 
understanding and cooperation within an individual company, 
in this case, the A. S. Campbell Company of East Boston, 
Massachusetts. 
I . THE PROBLEM 
Statement o:(_ the problem. This thesis is a study of 
the labor-management relations at the A. S o Campbell 
Company in order to (1) discover what problem or problems 
exist, and (2) devise a workable plan of action to solve 
them. 
IL THE PURPOSE 
Importance of the study. The author had a two-fold 
purpose in writing this thesis ~ (1) to reveal any 
difficulties which may hinder efficient production and 
sound human relations at the A. S. Campbell Company, and 
(2) to emphasize the value of an integrated, long-range, 
employee-employer relations program. 
-::------= 
III. METHODS 
The following methods were employed to obtain data 
for this thesis. 
The author had formal and informal interviews with 
the Personnel Director of A.S.CampbeLl Company, Mr. Edmund 
V. Maloney, and his assistant Mr. Robert Raymond. Also, 
~ormal and informal interviews were conducted among company 
executives and employees. The f ormal intervi ews were aided 
by questionnaires, all of which may be found in the Appendix. 
When the author first consulted the Personnel 
Director, he f ound that Mr. Maloney was primarily concerned 
with the union that represented the men in the plant , the 
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. 
After talking with him and his assistant, the author 
began to see that the difficulties , for the most part J were 
centered in the area of employee-employer relations. And 
gradually he worked out a series of questions which he 
submitted to Mr. Maloney. Through further conversations 
with him , the author learned that Mr. Maloney had his own 
ideas about the union. His ideas took the form of 
accusations against union policy , which he described as 
deliberate slowdowns, strikes, broken promises, and 
contract violations. The author was concerned with the 
human relations problems of A. S. Campbell Company that 
stood behind these accusations. What was obviously 
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necessary then was r esearch into the human problems that 
impinged upon the company. 
The author accepted the fact that there was dis-
satisfaction in the plant between employee and employer. 
three questions then arose. They were~ 
What are the possible causes of the problems? 
Are any outside factors involved? 
What can be done to dissolve the troubles? 
With respect to outside factors~ the author did not 
l ose sight of the fact that there may be some suspicion on II lj 
the part of the reader about the reputed left-wing leadership li 
of the United Electrica~~ Radio and Machine Workers of 
1 
America. However~ in view of recent NLRB elections (in 
which left and right-wing factions battled for favor)~ and 
in view of the results of this survey (see Chapter IV)~ the 
author has considered the effect of left-wing leadership 
negligible. Nevertheless ~ it must always be remembered 
that there may be some slight leftist influence upon union 
policy. 
This thesis will attempt to show that the trouble 
11 
I 
I 
exists within the plant and independent of external politico- II 
II 
II 
economic influence. 
The author started first through informal talks with 
I 
I Messers Maloney and Raymond to form a general picture of 
I 
the company--its methods of operation~ historical background~ I 
and the type of people employed. To o~ the author 'I li 
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found it necessary to study plant publications and n otices. 
Examples of these may also be found in the Appendix. 
A series of pre-tested pilot questionnaires were 
I 
drawn up and submitted to all the executives , to local union j 
officials , and to the shop stewards. The main value of the 
questioning lay as much in the formal answers received as 
in occasional and unguarded comments. These were usually 
enc ouraged by leading questions that probed a little deeper 
each time. The questions were designed to facilitate such 
probing. 
Executives in particular would loosen up after the 
first twenty minutes of a conversation, and would drop 
phrases that were very often keys to attitudes and thinking 
far beyond official policy. This type of interview was 
',I 
I 
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successful since it revealed sub-surface thinking. Of 
equal importance were the informal talks with rank and file. !I 
Cognizant of the suspicion pencil and paper engenders the 
author decided against formal questions . Instead he 
informally worked into c onversations and attempted to 
memorize the important attitudes to be recorded later. The 
unfortunate aspect of this type of interview is that a 
definite question and answer column cannot be shown, but 
only a general statement that the men seemed to feel thus 
and so , or were against this and that. Even so, the 
apparent lack of scientific data to support resulting con-
ckusions does not necessarily detract from the validity 
'. 
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of the conclusions. 
The methods used to collect data for this thesis 
then are clear~ formal and informal interviews , research 
into plant publications and notices, and an analysis of the 
questionnaire s . These techniques were easy to execute. 
They promised the best results, and fitted the situation 
at hand. 
One of the main difficulties arising from the presen-
tation of this report lies in the fact that the writer has 
a limited knowledge of the public relations function. 
Therefore, any recommendations must not be considered a 
finished program. 
The professional consultant, with a large staff of 
experienced associates, can provide so many more services 
to implement a program of this nature. 
After completing a survey , the consultant can advise. 
and be listened to with great respect, and thereupon can put 
his program into motion. Financial and economic reports, 
an experienced eye, the money to place a man in the firm 
to insure that he has his program carried out--all these 
factors and many more are at his fingertips. He can 
estimate costs with considerable accuracy. He can also tell 
how long the program should take; what a short term plan 
entails; or what the final results of the long term program 
may be. As a professional he can render profession, 
responsible services. 
I 
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Statement of or~anization. The remainder of the 
thesis ;Ls divided into four chapters. 
Chapter II is a history of the A. S. Campbell Company 
and has been divided into three sections~ 1910-1941~ 1941-
1945~ and 1945-1949. 
Chapter III has two parts~ Part I is a picture of 
A. S. Campbell Company in 1949~ and Part II attempts to 
picture company-union difficulties . 
A discussion and a n analysis of the questionnaires 
follow in Chapter IV. 
Chapter V is also divided into two parts: Part I -
Conclusions that will reflect the results of the survey; 
and Part II-Recommendations for a public relations program 
which) the author believes, may solve A.S.Campbell problems. 
IV. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Left-wing unionism. Left-wing unionism will be 
construed to mean that faction of union management following 
the Communist creed~ which advocates the downfall of 
capitalism and free enterprise. 
Right-wing unionism. Right-wing unionism will be 
interpreted to mean that faction of union management advo-
cating cooperation and perpetuation of capitalistic 
enterprises. 
Taft-Hartely Law . The Labor-Management Relations 
6 
-----== 
Act of 1947 will herea fter be referred to as the Taft-
Hartley Law . 
UE. The United ElectricalJ Radio and Machine Workers 
of America~ r epresenting the production workers of A. S. 
Campbell Company . 
Moral wage. A moral wage is defined as sufficient 
salary to keep a n entire family on a decent living standard. 
Mul~ip~ e manageme~t . Multiple management is a system 
of communication designed and operated by McCormi ck Tea 
Co.~ that ma kes use of the inventive or creative urges of 
working men~ who with n o outlet, would forget their ideas . 
Al so, any mention of the war shall be interpret ed 
to mean t he world conflict that l as ted from 1939 t o 1945 . 
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CHAPTER II 
A HISTORY OF A. S. CAMPBELL COMPANY 
Alphonso Campbell established the A. S . Campbell 
Company in 1910 on Commercial Street~ Boston~ Mass. Here 
the company originated and manufactured "Cello" metal h o t 
water bottles ~ and various electrical fittings for marine 
equipment. Other products~ such as marine searchlights~ 
aluminum canteens~ messkits~ automobile dome lights ~ and 
rear window curtains~ were added a few years later. 
was owner~ president~ and sales manager. The names of minor 
executives of that era have been erased by time as their 
influence was slight. None of the present executives have 
been with the company for more than twenty years. 
The original factory was destroyed by fire in 1919~ 
after which a two story building~ with 25~000 square feet 
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of floor space~ was acquired in July 1920 at the present site , 
in East Bost on. This building was rented from Mead-Morrison 
! 
Manufacturing Company. A third story and other wings were I 
added in 1929 ~ increasing floor space to 49~ 507 square feet. 'I 
In 1927~ clear vision corner pillars were designed 
and manufactured by Campbell Company for the Star (Durant) 
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automobile. From 1927 to 1936, clear vision corner pillars 
and door posts were manufactured for the Auburn, Franklin, 
Chrysler, and Packard automobiles. The corner piflars which 
had been ordered by Packard were part of their (Packard) 
production until 1936. 
Neil C. Raymond was sent by Packard in 1929 to 
expedite the products which Campbell was manufacturing for 
them. Impressed with Mr. Raymond's ability, Mr. Campbell 
called him back a short time later to assume the position of 
factory manager. He held this post until 1933, when as a 
result of reorganization, he became executive vice-president. 
When Mr. Campbell died in 1940, Mr. Raymond became president 
of the company, a position he holds today. 
The business remained stable despite the depression 
until 1931. By then orders were extremely few and the busi-
ness had entered into a critical phase. Although labor 
relations were described as "smooth-running" at this time, 
wages were very low , Orders were practically non-existent 
by 1933, and the company was reorganized and incorporated . 
This step helped to improve the business of th.e company 
during the latter months of 1933 , and a crew was hired for 
the buffing and polishing departments. These men formed 
the nucleus about which the movement for unionization began, 
and today they are the staunchest union supporters. 
In 1932, an adjustable license plate frame was 
designed, and since then, it has been sold to automobile 
9 
manufacturers ~ chain stores~ and jobbers throughout the 
United States~ Canada~ Mexico~ and Cuba. The company was 
compe lled to stimulate demand by promoting interest among 
car owners~ but after two years the item gained wide accep-
tance and became standard factory equipment. In 1934 Mr. 
Campbell persuaded automobile manufacturers that their bum-
per guards and grille guards were efficient enough but l ack-
ing in beauty. And having designed a bumper guard that em-
bodied b oth aspects~ he began to sell them in ever-increas-
ing numbers. Also~ he designed and sold a 10"-14" master 
guard for the automobile industry in 1937. 
Campbell bumper and grille guards became standard 
equipment for most automobiles ~ and the company was estab-
lished as the leading producer of these items. Annual sales 
of bumper guards four years prior to the war are listed as 
fol l ows: 
1 938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
455~000 
830~000 
1 ~220~000 
1~520~000 
Although sales dollars had tripled during this period~ 
production in 1 941 was les s than twice that of 1 938 . 
Price increases accounted for some of this larger d ollar 
volume . Prior to the war~ A. S. Campbell had secured a 
firm h old on this market and on that of license plate frames; 
roughly seventy-eight per cent of A. S. Campbel~ sales were 
10 
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g u ards and twenty per cent license fra mes. 
Until 1 940 the company was under the a ctive leader-
! 
ship of its f ounder who , sta rting with less than 50 employees : 
I 
increase d operations until 260 were employed in 1938; 375 
in 1 941; a nd ove r 1 , 000 at the wa r time peak. 
From 1 940 to the end of World Wa r II , the A. S . 
Campbell Company tra veled through various sta ges 
I 
of labor un- I 
rest , pea k production schedules, and reconversion difficulti~ 
The l a b o r troubles, however , were of prima ry importa nce . 
The role that Mr. Campbell had played in the labor 
relat i ons of his plant wa s indeed a strong one. Up t o the 
time of his de a th he continued to keep in touch with his 
employees , having hired mos t of them himself. 
Yet his paterna listic a ttitude had engendered a 
marked resentment a mong the employees. This resentment ) 
when combined with a national undercurrent fav oring union-
I 
'I 
I 
I 
ism among American wage earners, resulted in the first strike I 
in pla nt history. The strike ) f or a compa ny union and 
higher wages, ended with the formation of a company union 
that lasted from May to November 1 941. 
However , in September 1941 the c ompany union ordered 
another strike, this time over wages. And during this 
strike the United Electrical , Radio and Ma chine Workers of 
America petitioned to enter the plant. The c ompany settled 
I 
il 
'I 
\ the strike by granting union demands. 
~~~~~~o~ur~ng negotiations that rollowed and 
Agita ti on continued 
culminated in the 
II 
I 
I 
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signing of a contract with UE on November 25, 1941 . The 
main point of contention at that time was wages, including 
piece rates . The decision favored the union. 
The transition from company union to UE was effected 
by the nucleus of men hired in 1933 for the buffing and 
polishing departments . 
The British Government had ordered the manufacture 
of 20 millimeter cartridge ca.ses and a contract had been 
signed in March 1941. (The efficient fulfillment of this 
contract exerted considerable pressure upon Campbell Company 
to maintain industrial peace . ) In order to facilitate 
production of the cartridge cases, Campbell Company 
acquired the Mead~Morrison holdings, consisting of two 
buildings and the property located adjacent to Campbell 
buildings at 161 Prescott Street, East Boston. This raised 
their holdings to approximately 399,000 square feet . And 
the United States Government, in assisting the conversion 
to war work, loaned money and equipment necessary for ex-
tensive improvements. 
Retooling took ten months, and production began 
December 1, 1941. To the British order was added a Navy 
contract for the same product . Further retoolin$ enabled 
the procurement of other contracts for such w.ar products as 
dummy bomb cases, burster bomb cases, and submarine 
switchboxes . 
There were "no-strike" pledges at this time; contract:; 
were signed with UE each year with a minimum of confusion. 
The company liberalized conditions each time . Vacations, 
wage levels, and piece rates remained on a par with the 
area level . 
In 1944 Campbell Company purchased the Hunt-Spiller 
Manufacturing Corporation employing about 625. It was a 
135 year old foundry spe cializing in the manufacture of 
wear-resisting cast iron (called gun iron), steel and bronze 
castings for steam locomotives, diesel engines, buses, 
trucks, marine equipment, and miscellaneous industrial 
purposes . Hunt-Spiller is a wholly owned subsidiary . 
Top war-time employment of 1,000 began to decline 
steadily to the present 400 at Campbell, and 300 at Hunt-
Spiller ~ 
After V-J Day, the reconversion process started; 
the manufacture of bumper guards and the license plate 
frames was resumed. An additional product was added--
farm and luggage trailers for domestic and foreign trade . 
A three week strike .in 1946 crippled the plant from 
April 3 to 19, until a new contract was signed. The major 
point in the dispute was wages . Again the union won the 
strike with new and better clauses added to the contract . 
Part of the issue during this strike was union participa-
tion in rate and time studies. 
However, from July 21 to September 25, the major 
13 
issue over which the union pulled the men out pf the plant 
was time studies~ and for the first time the company re-
fused to arbitrate. Edmund V. Maloney, acting as Labor 
Relations Director, stated that the union demands were 
inimical to management policy regarding union encroachment 
on its rights. Union participation in time studies was 
denied, and the strike failed. 
Mr. Maloney had joined the company in February 1946, 
taking over the personnel department which had been started 
in 1943. His predecessors~ .Mr. Convey and Mr . Welsh had 
proved ineffective according to executive opinion. Mr. 
Convey left the plant after suffering a nervous breakdown, 
and Mr. Welsh left to join the U. S. Department of Labor. 
Apparently the company is in good financial condition 
according to Standard and Poor's Stock reports. There has 
been a steady progress in net sales since 1939. There was 
a greater ratio of increase during the post war period than 
during the war years. The stock is selling at a price to 
yield about seven per cent , which is above the average of 
five per cent on usual over-the-counter stocks. 
Standard and Poor 1 s prediction stated, "Despite a 
later decline, in line with expected automobile production, 
earnings should continue relatively large, and the $.25 
quarterly dividend should provide a liberal yield."l 
1 Standard and Poor's Stock Reports, Vol.l5 No. 65. 
Section 4, June 6, 1949. 
14 
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CHAPTER III 
After a brief description of plant exterior , Chapter 
III will attempt to paint a word picture of .A. S. Campbell 
Company through an observat ion of the various departments 
of the company. Each department will carry a capitalized 
sub -t itle t o aid the reader. 
I. A. S. CAMPBELL COMPANY~ AS OF 1949 
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Plant housekeeping at .A. S. Campbell Company was very !I 
:I 
poor. This situation was more noticeable in the office 
areas than in production areas. Many of the offices were I 
po orly arranged with inadequate office furniture; walls in 
many cases needed replastering and repainting. Nor did the 
brick buildings themselves appe ar to have had adequate 
maintenance over the years. Mortar had fal led out of many 
outside walls. In general ~ the outside c ountenance of A. S. 
Campbell Company needed an overall~ concentrated face-
lifting. 
BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT ~ A. S. Campbell Company was known 
to have the largest mechanized plating unit 
It s equipment consisted in part of 15 heavy 
in New England. ~~· 
hydraulic presses ~ j· 
!I 
15 heavy mechanical presses~ and 20 light mechanical presses 
for blanking~ forming~ clipping ~ and drawing. 
t~ 
This~ equ~~ment~~=-=== 
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most of which was procured by the Navy~ has been taken over 
by the company for peacetime operations. Although only one 
or two heavy duty presses had been acquired since V-J Day~ 
the equipment was not unlike that used by competitors~ and 
by present day standards was~ even if not new~ still 
competitive. 
In addition ~ there were extensive welding facilities 
which included electrical welding equipment~ together with 
fixtures for holding the parts being welded. The buffing 
il 
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and po]£hing equipment consisted of buffing jacks for manual j 
operation, two conveyorized polishing units and one large 
Pangborn Rotoblast machine. This last unit~ installed in 
1948 at a cost of $25~000~ had not yet been used extensively 
in production~ although it was purchased to reduce manual 
snagging and polishing operations. 
! 
II 
II 
The company was equipped with comp~etely conveyorized 
1
, 
rack plating units which consisted of both conveyor and 
plating tanks for copper~ nickel~ and -chromium solutions. 
Most of the plating facilties were segregated in the main 
building to meet the needs of license frame production. 
There was a Tool Room for building dies~ welding 
fixtures, ind making machine repairs. Some of the machine 
tools had been purchased so the company was (in 1949) 
equipped t o handle all the work required by current orders. 
Machinery in the plant connected to unit drives: all 
II ,, 
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over-head shafts were torn out some time ago. JL~==-~-
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Most of the equipment was h oused in the main building 
where the chief product, bumper guards, was fabricated.This 
main building , a two story structure with 115,000 square 
I 
I' 
,I 
:I 
feet of flo or space, had gallery decks built around the ends !j 
and sides of the building to house packing, inspecting, and 
a few production offices. The center bays over most of the 
production f aci l ities were open. 
Any ov e rflow from bumper guard production was 
located on two floors of the second of these buildings . 
Production requirements largely dictated the need f or any 
overflow capacity . In addition, special draw and bracket 
fabrications were performed here. The second floor of this 
building was taken over by license frame production. Space 
requirements for blanking , forming, and plating these parts 
were n o t . demanding . Also h ouse d in this building were 
personnel office s, conference rooms, and a cafeteria operated 
by an outside firm. 
The third and smallest building was a two story 
structure in which mos t of the eighty office employee s were 
;L ocated. 
When the City of Bo ~ t on brought pre ssure upon the 
company to move its building s eastward twenty-five to fifty 
feet, the company refused. Since a +arge highway artery was 
being constructed from Summer Tunnel north, the city 1 s need 
f or additional space h a d become urgent . Many approaches to 
this highway had already been built. In Apri~ , after 
I 
I 
I 
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considerable newspaper publicity , the city decided t o with-
draw the demand. Mr. Raymond had threatened to move his 
plant t o the midwest if demands were pressed. Such a move 
would have resulted in a substantial loss of jobs and taxes . 
PRODUCTION ~ Production was the r esponsibility of Mr. Hugh 
Johnstone who was shifted from f oreman to Factor y Superin-
tendent the previous year. As Superintendent, Mr. J ohnstone 
had complete control over quality , in addition to hi s 
production duties. This switch of quality control from the 
Engine e ring Department added another foreman t o the list of 
thirteen. (A shake-up in the number of f oremen may have 
made some of this data inaccurate.) The change reduce d and 
Combined foremen r esponsibilities so that a major reduction 
in the number of foremen was made. Such a change was in line 
with drastically curtailed production and points up the 
flexibility of the t otal production picture. 
Over seventy-five per cent of all production consisted 
of bumpe r guards. The sequence of operations to meet 
various manufactuer's r equirements have varied , but a standard 
pattern was roughly as follows~ 
Flat s he et stock was unloaded from fre i ght cars by a 
crane inside the main building. Production schedules 
usually called f or sending ten thou sand units into the plant 
as one batch. Enoug h s tock was then sheared in the raw 
18 
material storage area for such a quantity. Sheared to 
desired width, the stock was routed to the Press Department 
for blanking, drawing, and slipping operations . After being 
coated by a special greasing compound the metal was hand-fed 
into the machine for each operation . When the press 
operations had been completed on one lot, it was degreased 
and taken to the welding area by fork truck . One welder then 
placed six or eight units on a fixture and attached studs 
and brackets by electr~c welding. Studs are purchased 
outside but brackets were fabricated by the company. 
After welding, the lot was transported to the snaggers 
who removed tool marks, scratches, and the irre~ular outside 
skin. In this operation the snagger held the part to an 
abrasive wheel revolving on a jac.k. Usually , two polishing 
operations and one snagging operation prepared the part for 
the first plating bath . Polishing could be performed on the 
mechanized conveyor with automatic polishing wheels or it 
could be performed manually. Here, the shape of the part 
was largely the deciding factor . 
After polishing, the lot was then ready for a copper 
bath . At this time , the parts were placed on racks which 
accommodated approximately twelve pieces. This rack was 
carried by the -extensive conveyor line to the copper tanks. 
There , it was dipped separately in plating solutions--acid 
and water--and replaced on the conveyor . . Nearby in the 
c o loring room, parts were taken from the conveyor as they 
19 
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passed and colored manually on buffing jacks using cloth 
wheels. The same process was repeated for nickel and 
chromium dips until a plate to meet automobile specifications 
of .00035 of an inch was achieved . 
Finally, the conveyor extended into the packing room 
where the bumper guards were final-inspected and packed . 
At times the process almost reached a line production setup . 
However, there was considerable handling and transporting by 
truck from one department to another. Also, there were 
numerous hand operations required by the average part, which 
was polished or buffed individually six or seven times. This 
accounted for a pproximately seventy-five per cent of the 
direct labor applied against each item . Because buffing and 
polishing is strenuous work, all operators are men. 
License plate frame production was accomplished by a 
self-contained unit with its own plating tank, small presses 
and special machines. Women were chiefly employed in this 
·work, for the brass parts were small and light. Considerable 
assembly work also made women more desirable . 
SALES ~ Products were sold to three groups of customers~ 
automobile manufacturers, automotive and accessory jobbers, 
and special order customers . During the preceding year, 
auto manufacturers had taken over ninety per cent of the 
Campbell production output of bumper guards. Sales to 
jobbers were comprised chiefly of special auxillary grille 
·I 1: 
I and trunk guards . This product was designed by the Campbell 1 
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Company to give added protection to motorists not satisfied 
with the smaller "bumperettes," which are assembled on 
bumpers by automobile manufacturers. 
There was n o acting Sales Manager of the Campbell 
Company at the time of this investiga tion . Instead, three 
separate salesmen all reported directly to Mr. Raymond. 
Messers Campbell, son of the founder, and Porter handled 
Detroit sales. Both spent a great deal of their time in that 
area . Jobbing sales we re handled by Mr. J ohnson who had only 
been with the company about a year. 
In 1948 sales were over $7 million as c ompared with 
the best prewar year of $2 million in 1 941. Despite this 
showing, monthly sales in 1949 were running well under 1 948 
although auto production was approaching an all-time monthly 
peak of over 400,000 units in March, and competitors' plants 
were loaded to capacity. Ward's Automotive Report on April 
18, 1 949 corroborated these fact s with the following report: 
Sharp upturn in passenger car sales, coupled with 
marked improvement in material deliveries give promise 
of second quarter year product ion totals excee~ing even 
the high volume thought likely last month end. 
Whereas the March 28 i ssue of these reports predicted 
... an industry output of more than 1,270,000 units 
for the highest 3 month period since 1937, present in-
dications place the probable figure closer to the high 
of 1,506,494 reached in the 1929 second quarter.2 
l Ward' s Automotive Report, April 18, 1 94 9 . 
2 Ward's Automotive Report, March 28, 1949 . 
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Sales to automobile manufacturers were largely on a 
price basis~ althoug h certa in old customers~ such as Packard~ 
generally purchased Campbell products despite a few cents 
price disparity. However~ most manufacturers accepted or 
rejected bids purely on price. Most of Ca mpbell's guards 
were priced around $1.80 each to the manufacturer . 
Auto producers~ to keep their inventories low~ pur-
chased in such a manner that their suppliers carried the 
inventory burden. Customarily~ annual contracts were placed 
in a plant with authorization to purchase material for a small 
percentage of the order ~ Production was then authorized to 
begin on part of the material with specified weekly shipments. 
Manufacturers usually send out large orders when a new model 
goes into production; reorders are not frequent~ although 
releases against the initial order can be made periodically . 
Selling to this trade was~ therefore~ concentrated in the 
autumn when new models were tooled up. 
Competition in this field has become increasingly 
stiff. Soon after the war~ new entries into the bumper guard 
field emerged. Most of these were midwest manufacturers . 
F. L. Jacobs and Houdaille Hershey companies both entered the 
field. Parker Wolverine~ a Detroit concern active before the 
war ~ was now the biggest independent supplier . Eaton Manu-
facturing Co. of Cleveland has also entered the market . In 
addition~ there are the Brown-Lipe-Chapin Co.~a subsidiary of 
General Motors~ and the other auto manufacturers who supply 
22 
a percentage of their own needs. An indication of the trend 
was found in the 1948 Directors Report of General Motors: 
Our capacity is being further expanded with additional 
press equipment in Syracuse and the installation of two 
large plating tank units and other equipment in Elyria. 
Production for 1949 should reach an all time high.3 
That auto manufacturers then were determined to pro -
duce an increasing percentage of their requirements became 
more and more evident. Doubtless the same seemed true of 
General Motors and Ford , although the smaller independents 
seemed to rely upon outside capacity. The second consider-
ation noted from the emergence of competition was the prox-
imity of the new suppliers to the manufacturers . Freight 
rates thus became another significant factor in the cost of 
this item. 
From Boston to Detroit the freight cost was approxi-
mately five cents per unit. A. S. Campbell Company quoted 
prices F.O.B . Boston, which was lower by the estimated 
freight rate to Detroit, but, in s o doing the company was 
less prepared to wage a price battle. Shipments to assem-
bly plants, such as Sommerville and Framingham would have 
been advantag eous . Ford, however J did not purchase from 
Campbell, and General Motors purchased only part of their 
requirements from Campbell. These were the only plants where 
3 Directors Report of General Motors , March 1948. 
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a competitive freight advantage could accrue to the Boston 
firm. There appeared to be little handicap with respect to 
freight rates on incoming steel, as competitors shipped 
roughly the same distance. 
Selling to jobbers does not bear the seasonality of 
selling to auto producers. After a slow start during the 
first quarter j sales picked up because the line of guards 
had been expanded to cover all auto makers, offering a real 
service to jobbers. Sales pressure had not been exerted 
by jobbers before because their line was incomplete; instead 
they concentrated on other items. 
Auxiliary guard sales represented a $7 million busi-
ness of which Campbell's leading competitor , VanAuken Co., 
took $4 million. Of all auto accessories this ibm represents 
the highest d ollar volume. The Campbell Co . was third in 
the field , preceded by VanAuken Co. and the Helms Co . Grille 
and trunk guards take a variety of forms and as time passed, 
the tendency was to make them stronger and more elaborate. 
The standard guard was sold to jobbers at $8.75 and finally 
retailed by auto equipment suppliers at $21 . 95. 
License plate frames were sold both to jobbers and 
auto manufacturers. Since these sales represented less than 
twenty per cent of the total volume, little aggressive sell-
ing was applied to this item . Nor was any definite pattern 
followed in seeking trailer contracts . Usually the tendency 
was to wait for inquiries. 
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FINANCIAL POSITION~ Despit e the fact that the sales ,, 
picture was cloudy, Campbell Company seemed to be in a 
:I 
reasonably s ound financial position. The cash situation 
was good. Recent emphasis on a new inventory control 
program had shown marked results since 1947. Of the 
<i-6 '11 . ~ 71,000 in notes payable as of December 31, 1948, approxi-
mately $344,000 was retired before April 1, 1949. The 
I 
company 3 s remaining notes were long term ones due 1 951-1957 o !I 
When Hunt-Spiller was acquired in 1944 for $1,300,000, '1 
j, 
the Campbell Company began the process of swallowing a ·! 
II 
li 
company somewhat larger in net worth than itself. During 
the merger, Hunt-Spiller borrowed a mil~lion dollars and 
II loaned it to A. S. Campbe l l to pay of Campbell stockholders. · 
!i Since 1944 high profits have enabled the company to convert 
this arrangement into one of s ound financial standing, and 
capital improvements at Hunt-Spiller of over $500,000 have 
been made. 
In 1945, Mr. Neil C. Raymond, with 13,000 shares of 
common stock, was the larges t holder of the 87,000 shares 
outstanding o Several other stockholders retained as many 
as 3,000 shares, but most of the 500 holders of the common 
were small . Campbell stock has followed the market down 
:1 
I 
II 
,, 
'j 
il 
from a high of $23 in 1945 to $8.50 in 1949. Stock of J 
other automotive parts companies has been equal~y depressed 
despite excellent earning records. Every year since 1935, 
A. S. Campbell Company has paid a dividend. 
II 
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II. THE WORK FORCE 
A. S. Campbell Company cannot be fully described with-
out giving proper attention to a work force that represents 
one of the largest groups of skilled buffers and polishers 
in New England. Most of these workers were first genera-
tion Americans of Italian and Polish extraction, pre-
dominately Ca tholic. 
That the company was a "sweat shop" prior to the war 
was a statement often made by these employees. Wages were 
the state minimum, forty cents per hour, and tough tactics 
were used by management to reach the desired output . Due 
to such a condition union activity found a fertile field 
during the late thirties. 
A practice of "bumping"--similar to that found on most 
railroads, and one which reduced volume had precipitated--
was a serious problem faced by both employees and the pro-
duction department. Bumping was part of the union contract 
and specified that a man of higher seniority, if no longer 
required on his present job, could request the position of 
a man with lower seniority. The burden of proof was upon 
the older man who had to demonstrate his ability to perform 
the new task. There was , however, an understandable re-
duction in efficiency per department despite the fact that 
each job did have a piece rate which had to be met . If 
nothing else, the fear of layoff or of being bumped was a 
- ------ ~ 
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contributing factor to lower plant morale. 
A strong belief existed at A. S. Campbell Company and 
similar companies that there was always a high correlation 
between the number of buffers employed and unrest throughout 
the plant. One theory advanced for such an attitude among 
this group of production workers was that the tremendous 
physical exert ion required in forcing each part against the 
wheelproduced short tempers. Buffing is a highly skilled 
job, and as such it is not too difficult to mislead a time 
study man who checks speed and effort o Union difficulties 
have arisen largely from this group in respect to piece 
rates established by the company. 
By V-J day , a period of union consolidation had been 
completed a nd the stage was set for the second period. This 
period extended from 1946 t o September 1948 and was charac-
terized by union intimidation of management.(See Chapter II.) 
Management , in granting each round of wage increases and 
in making other concessions, displayed a desire to maintain 
production at all costs. By the summer of 1948, the union, 
the company said , was virtually setting output standards 
by using "slowdown" tactics. Management estimated produc-
tion losses were forty to fifty per cent. Ill feeling ran 
high while contract negotiations were in progress and cul-
minated in a strike that lasted ten weeks. During the strike 
production was maintained by removing dies and subcontract-
27 
ing the work to various plants in the midwest. 
The third period, one of sharply increased productivity 
per man , was cut short by the sudden curtailment of require-
ments beginning in January 1949. At the time of this study, 
(June 1949) the fourth period--one of lowered morale occa-
sioned by the lack of job security was still in progress. 
The regular Thursday grieva nce meeting had been filled with 
complaints on bumping procedure, and on how much work fore-
men were permitted to perform within their departments. 
The shift in emphasis was toward spreading out work to as 
many men as p ossible. 
In none of the union meetings witnessed did there seem 
to be a mutual c onfidence displayed by either management 
o r labor. The Chief Engineer and others have voiced the 
feeling that employees did not understand nor were they will-
ing to participate in c os t reductions. The s a me thing was 
pointed up sharply in Mr. Raymond's letter (See Appendix A) 
in which the blame for present conditions was directed 
solely t oward t he employees. The letter brought no notice-
able response f r om employees. 
Union contracts were administered by the Personnel 
Office , hea ded by Mr. Maloney , through whom all grievances 
were funneled. Hiring and discharging as well as the usual 
employee programs of hea lth , recreation, and so forth were 
handled by this office. Weekly meetings were held where the 
union grievance committee (six persons) met with one of the 
28 
Personnel Department members. The Factory Superintendent~ 
about whom much of the discussion revolved ~ refused to be 
present. Seldom~ therefore~ could immediate ~ definitive 
action be taken. 
Since seventy-five per cent of all factory jobs were 
piece work ~ constant time studies on b oth new and old jobs 
had to be carried forward. As a result of these studies~ 
methods were improved and operations eliminated or combined . 
Frequently the custom was to time-study the department fore-
man on each job and rate his effort as llo per cent of normal ~ 
because he was in most cases better than the average operator. 
In this way the company was assured of attaining a reasonable 
yardstick for each particular task. 
Labor 1 s present attitude seemed to be one of dividing 
the remaining work among the existing employees. High 
rates of production could not have been their concern when 
there was a possibility that one of their number would be 
released for lack of work. This attitude may be termed 
shortsighted ~ but it remained the wage earner's view~ unless 
he could be convinced of its fallacy through positive 
action by manag ement. 
There are a number of devices whereby management could 
win the confidence of labor. First and foremost~ a respon-
sible management official could be assigned to the grievance 
meetings with the authority to settle disputes. Wage 
29 
earners would eventually come to trust this man , and he would 
then be in a position to organize the men into work groups. 
He could very easily foster the spirit of competition between 
work groups. He ma y even be able to persuade management to 
let the men aid in setting the piece rates, which they would 
no doubt favor. Bonuses could be paid according to the output 
of groups or of individuals, if a system could be worked out 
t o the satisfaction of all. 
A striking similarity exists between labor a nd manage-
ment at A. S. Campbell. Each seems to suffer from a lack of 
security~ labor from job security, and Campbell from security 
in the future. An honest attempt to study the problems of 
wage earners , such as mentioned above, would go a long way 
toward increasing security for all. J obs would be secure 
because the company would have reduced costs so as to compete 
with other manufacturers . The company would have security 
in a l a rge backlog of orders. 
30 
CHAPTER IV 
Da ta and information contained in Chapter IV was 
obtained by means of personal interviews with executives and 
wage earners who had time to answer the questions. No 
attempt was made to interview according to a previously 
charted representative sample. Even so, certain patterns 
of thought and action were definitely discernible , and 
pertinent information that may substantiate the conclusions 
can also be found. Tables were constructed in order to 
display graphically the ideas and opinions underlying the 
answers from these men . 
I. EXECUTIVE. INTERVIEWS 
Among the interviews with executive personnel, there 
was a noticeable dissimilarity between the answers to 
Questions l and 2. Although fifty -five per cent of the men, 
or five out of nine , believed that the President set 
company policy , two said that department heads did,one s aid 
the Ways & Means committee, and one said there was no 
company policy. The split was even greater in the matter of 
who determined A. S. Campbell labor policy . Only thirty-
three per cent, or three out of nine , said that both the 
President and the Personnel Department set labor policy. 
Two said the Personnel Department alone set company labor 
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policy. 
However, all nine agreed that there was n o real 
/1 
public relations program at Campbell. And to the question 
about improving what public relations there was at Campbell, ' 
I 
seven out of nine replied that communication between labor 
and management should be improved, while two wished to re-
move the left-wing elements from the union as a method of 
improving public relations. 
Even though eight out of nine agreed that their 
plant labor force was ab ove average in ability, all nine 
thought that the Local 262, United Electrical, ~adio and 
Machine Workers was not good for the men. However, all 
nine men interviewed were in favor of the union movement 
in the United States. 
Only three men thought that communication between 
labor and management was improving, one did not answer , 
and five thought relations were very poor. 
Sixty-six per cent of the executives interviewed 
said business trends affect A. S. Campbell Company , one 
said there was no effect, and two did not answer. 
Most of the executives interviewed were objective 
and honest in their answers; in general, they believed 
that the union stewards of Lo cal 262 were unable to handle 
men. The lot, they said , were uneducated and unable to 
employ tact, diplomacy , and consideration in the 
manipulation of human beings. 
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II. WAGE EARNER INTERVIEWS 
As f or the setting of company policyJ the thirteen 
wage earners inte rviewed replied with a vari ety of answers. 
Three thought the President set policy , three said the 
Personnel Department did, and t hree s aid both President 
and Pers onnel Department .s e t policy. Four men said the 
Board of Directors set company policy at Campbell. 
Regarding the union policy, s even state d that the 
rank and file gave orders on p olicy which were carried ou t 
by union officers. Three thought the union president set 
policy, while three said union hierarchy set the policy. 
Each agreed however , that there was a well-defined p olicy 
set by the union. 
Sixty-one per cent of the wage earners interviewed 
thought that the company did not understand the needs of 
the men. Five were agreed that Campbell at times displayed 
an understanding of men 1 s needs. 
In response to the question,"Does the union represent 
the individual?'' , ninety-two per cent or twelve out of 
thirteen replied ~ "Yes." Only one disagreed , and he said, 
"Sometimes." 
According t o twelve out of thirteen men interviewed 
the United Radio , Electr ical and Machine Workers was a 
democratic union. ("Democratic" meaning representation of 
the rank and file in governing the union.) 
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With respect to left-wing unionism in UE, the men 
gave more diversified answers. Three said there was left-
wing influence , four said there was· none, three did not 
know , and three agreed that at times there seemed to be 
some left - wing influence. 
Business conditions in general coul d affect the jobs 
of seven men interviewed . Four said business conditions 
would have n o effect on their jobs , while two did not know. 
jl 
I 
The general impression that wage earners he l d of their II 
I 
management was divided into three answers. Over half t h e 
men ~ s e v en out of thirteen, thought that m~nagement a t 
A. S . Campb e ll Company had n o knowledge of human r e l ations . 
Three men thought tha t management was behind the time s in 
modern administrative techniques, and three thought that 
management ~s t h eories were serious l y outdated. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I o CONCLUSIONS 
Few industries goad their suppliers as fiercely as 
the automotive industry J since its product has become such 
an integral p a rt of family life. The automobile is probably 
the most complex of all consumer items where mass production 
has permitted mass ownership. To sustain and strengthen 
the ir place in the American economic structureJ these 
manufacturers continually demand from suppliers improved 
products at lower prices. 
One question then faces A. S. Campbell: How to sur-
vive such a competitive battle? The answer to thisJ if dis-
c overed at allJ lies in the finished product itselfJ quality 
plus labor plus costs. 
Competition is strongest where facilities and "know 
how" for manufacturing are needed least. Of all parts J the 
production of simple stampings is probably the most competi-
tive. To complete the chief Campbell productJ welding and 
plating facilties must be added which is not complicatedJ 
and if necessaryJ a supplier could subcontract these 
I requirements. ThereforeJ entering the bumper guard field 
J does not require an extensive capital outlay; at leastJ to 
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date large expenditures have not been necessary. 
Another group of products , not highly competitive , 
are those either protected by patent or those which, by 
means of their complexity, give the supplier who has expert 
engineering and knowledge of production a protective status 
with manufacturers. Entry by outsiders is usually prohibi- J: 
tive due to necessary technical skill and equipment costs. J' 
Bumper guards enjoy no such competitive advantages. I 
On the c ontrary, this item, because it represents increasing-! 
ly higher costs to the manufacturer than prewar guards, can 
expect further pressure from auto producers. The trend is 
to give motorists more area protection, requiring more 
steel with correspondingly more metal finishing. Expansion 
by auto manufacturers int o subsidizing plants is one in-
dication that they are seeking to keep down higher outlays 
by (1) supplying part of their needs , and (2) dictating 
prices in line with their known c osts. 
Campbell Co. policies may well have intensified some 
o f these contro lling devices now b e ing practiced by General 
Motors and others. Before the war , Campbell enjoyed pre-
eminence as a supplier of bumper guards. As orig~nators, 
the aut o industry widely sought their product. Postwar 
policies , however, did not represent a contribution either 
in low price or high quality. Instead , prices were high 
and quality low. Sales v o lume was deceivingly maintained 
under a protective blanket of steel which other suppliers 
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frequently lacked. No major steps were taken to pace the 
indus try. Producti on techniques have not been changed 
significantly since before the war. That alert manufacturers 
who could produce as well as Campbell without freight rate 
penalties, should emerge when material scarcities disappear-
ed was n ot at all surprising. 
Also , Campbell Co. must consider problems that may 
arise when auto demands are saturated. At that time if re-
duced auto prices do n ot stimulate further dema nd , it is 
entirely possible that prewar levels of buying will return. 
With such a condition , f e wer overflow requirements may be 
farmed out by the big three beqause their own facilities 
could supply a larger percentage. Moreover, there may be 
further tendencies for even the independents to purchase 
their needs from Jacobs , Houdiaall e -Hershey, and others 
who supply them with a wider line than does Campbell. 
If business is t o be recovered it must be on a price 
basis. Quality specified by auto producers has been s tabil-
ized t o the extent that n o wide variations oc cur among their 
suppliers. Lower prices , however, represent one area where 
customer attraction can easily be stimulated. 
What forms can cost reductions take at A. S. Campbell? 
The maj or area of cost reduction lies in the cutting of 
dire c t l a bor costs. To some extent this project runs counter 
to the c ompanyts major asset ~ skilled polishe rs and buffers. 
Not every industrial c ommunity can rely upon such a large 
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number of skilled workers of this category. However~ if 
unit costs are to be reduced some form of labor saving de-
vices or improvements are necessary. 
Much of Campbell Company's plight has been~ if n ot 
precipitated~ at l east hastened by the attitude of the work 
force. Production slow downs~ strikes~ and poor quality 
have contributed to Campbell 1 s present poor standing with 
their customers. Labor is~ to some extent~ not unmindful 
of the fact that their actions have resuLted in loss of 
business. However~ Mr. Raymond 1 s letter placing the blame 
solely upon them gained neither approval nor cooperation. 
Close scrutiny has l ead this investigator to believe 
that the present distrust between management and labor arises 
from the company's approach to labor's problems~ or la ck of 
approach . With the disappearance of the left-wing faction 
it was difficult to believe the work force chronic trouble-
makers. Inve stigation showed that there was no operating 
executive to whom they could look for a bold~ honest program 
in their behalf. The Factory Superintendent was unwilling 
to participate in weekly grievance meetings and there was no 
Factory Manager who might administer a l ong range policy. 
Mr. Raymond~ frequently away~ had little contact with the 
work force. The Personnel Manager listened to complaints 
but was not authorized to set policy. 
Both executive and wage earner interviews would seem 
to support the contention that policy setting at A , S. 
Campbell Company was never explicitly clear to those who set 
policy or those for whom it was set. The divers answers 
would indicate that management had never attempted to solid-
ify its position with its operating executives or employees. 
The fact that there were so many d ifferent answers as to 
the setting of labor policy--a segment of overall policy--
only strengthens the issue for a more complete, more defined 
, company policy, and for a more integrated system of commun-
icating that policy. 
All executives agreed that there was no real public 
relations program at Campbell, and , seven out of nine said 
that improving communication would be one means of beginning 
a sound public relations program, and improving human rela-
tions at Campbell. 
There was considerable dislike for the Local 262 
among the executives. However, these same men were in favor 
of the union movement in the United States. The crux was 
the stewards, who were considered unable to handle men 
properly. 
d As a possible insight to the thinking of s ome execu-
1 
II tives at A. S. Ca mpbell, the author offers their answers to 
the question on business conditions affecting the company. 
Only six men agreed that business conditions affected the 
company, the other three said no or did not answer. The 
author was surprised that one-third of the executives inter-
viewed did not realize that within the economic framework 
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of this country~ one company cannot exist independently of 
others. 
Among wage earners the fidelity and trust placed in 
their union was not surprising. Although they did not 
exactly know who set union . policy~ they were certain about 
the existence of a union policy~ and about "Democracy" in 
their union. 
The issue of left-wing unionism in UE was cloudy . This 
would indicate that with such a disjointed program of com-
munication~ the left-wing influence in Local 262 could not 
have been t oo heavy on the thinking of the men. Had Commu-
nism and its ensuing propaganda permeated the local, the 
men would have shown more agreement of interests~ more 
assurance in their answers. Therefore , the author feels 
se cure in stating that Communism had little or n o effect in 
the labor-management difficulties at A. S. Campbell Company. 
Wage earners showed little faith in their company. 
Over half the men interviewed agreed that management had 
little conception of huma n relations. Others thought that 
their administrative techniques were outdated~ and that their 
theories of ·management were behind the times . Their im-
pressions would seem to support the contention that manage -
ment at A. S. Campbell Company tended to follow tried and 
true paths ~ rather than developing new theories~ techniques~ 
4 2 
and~ most important of all ~ new products . 
Management then had no one who knew h ow to handle the -~~~ 
I 
I 
labor problem~ although both factions realized a problem 
existed. Yet to achieve any success with a cost reduction 
program~ labor 1 s participation and assistance was more than 
essential. The problem is highly acute in the area of cost 
reductions where labor saving devices may further reduce 
the work force. 
Besides the neglect of technical improvements and 
work force cooperation~ another area displays management 1 s 
lethargy . This is the area of new product development o Not 
since before the war has a new product been developed which 
could be marketed as a competitive item. The trailer and 
farm wagon have not proven economical to produce at compet-
itive prices. The purchase of a n ew product in the form of 
Hunt-Spiller castings might possibly lie in the area of new 
development. Unfortunately~ the acquisition of this new 
line cannot complement the production facilities of the 
parent company. 
II. RECOMMENDATIONS 
At A. S. Campbell Company there is definite need of a 
common~ realistic understanding of interdependent needs and 
interests of both labor and management~ and for effective 
methods of developing and maintaining such understanding. 
Thus far~ a noticeable lack of communication has been manifest 
between employees and employers. Bulletin boards~ if used 
at all~ were cluttered and unsightly. There is no plant 
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publication. The wage earner has no idea of company aims 
or aspirations, and no knowledge of policy over and above 
that which concerns him individually. He knows very little 
about the company and is, therefore , little interested in 
the future of A. S. Campbell. 
Within his limited knowledge of the public relations 
function and on the basis of this ivestigation, the author 
makes the following recommendations in an effort to institute 
a public relations program at A. S. Campbell Company. 
I. A System of two-way communication should be instituted 
by management, specifically the Personnel Department. Such a 
program would have to be introduced and promulgated with 
honest and sincere enthusiasm. Any other method would further 
the doubt and suspicion of the buffers and polishers. The 
investigator contends that if this troublesome department 
could be satisfied, the others would most likely concur: 
care must be taken, however, not to pursue any program so 
intently that other departments become envious or jealous. 
Under the heading of Communication the author consid-
ers the following; a plant newspaper, goodwill meetings, 
and the annual report. Other recommendations incl~de 
personal contacts by executives, improving plant appearance, 
and the education of foremen. 
HOUSE ORGAN~ Perhaps the most important single item 
in Communication is the company newspaper. Since the printed 
word does carry considerable opinion-moulding power, A. S. 
44 
II 
jl 
I 
45 
==-=-=~ =-o=-=-= 
I· 
.I 
j' 
---- ::.....=:.--~--=-====,;;.._ 
Campbell would d o well to initiate a house organ. This II 
I 
medium could very easily carry the company's story to em-
ployees~ and carry employee 1 s story to the company. The 
tremendous value of an internal organ has been overlooked by 
,I 
II 
il 
Campbell. There is nothing to keep the organization informed 1 
and closely knit. Emphasis here cannot be too great. 
BULLETIN BOARDS: Bulletin boards quite obviously 
should be cleaned up~ painted~ and generally made more at-
tractive. A neat bulletin board commands attention. Closer 
scrutiny should be placed upon the wording of notices~ be-
cause very often in the past~ ambiguity has caused resentment 
and fostered ill-feeling. 
GOODWILL MEETINGS: Goodwill meetings are a further 
technique of communication. Rank and file members of the 
plant need a chan.~e to understand more fully the mechanics 
of company policy. Explanations of what transpires when a 
new decision has been made will aid the men to work better 
because they know the "why''. The representative who explains 
policy should speak in understandable terms. Suggestions 
should be sought from the men~ and the temper of the group 
I 
II 
I! 
II 
II felt in order to ascertain the best methods of applying new 
I rulings or orders. 
II I 
ANNUAL REPORT: The annual report is another nail in 
the house of good communication. It should be written in 
s uch a way that it is clear not only to stockholders but also 
to rank and file. They are entitled to a full explanation 
j: 
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of the financial standing of their company. A thorough ~-i 
annual report will aid wage earners to get a comprehensive 
view of this company and its actions. Do not fill it with 
charts and graphs that delight economists and statisticians. 
More, of course, can be added to A.S. Campbell Company 
under the heading of Communication. However, since the 
company has no public relations department nor is it likely 
to hire outside counsef, the Personnel Department should not 
be burdened with too many unfamiliar techniques at the out-
set in order to display complete confidence before the work 
force. 
II . In any case, added effort must be expended to make 
foremen understand company poJicy to the fullest extent. 
They should be on management 1 s team. Their authority should 
never be shaded or indefinite. They should always have the 
1 opportunity to meet a new employee, and take an active part 
in his indoctrination. The realms of authority should be 
'
1 c l ear all the way up and down the line. Foremen should not 
be passed in the hiring of new personnel, nor in the se ~ection ' 
of men for promotion . Make foremen loyal members of manage-
ment by giving them rights and pay scales to which they are 
entitled. 
III. Internal personal contact should be improved. It has 
l,ong been known that most executives at A. S. Campbell have 
, had particularly bad telephone manners . Most men mumbled or 
I spoke incoherently over the telephone; they were short and 
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quick t o cut off the other party. A month of training in 
telephone manners could improve this situation considerably , 
Obviously , the well-being of the plant is r e flected 
in its physical appearance. Grass should b e planted where-
ever possible and kept well gro omed. Signs should be 
I 
maintained in good condition , and fences painted when needed. 
Lavat ories , showers , and the like should be cleaned daily. 
Make the men proud of or at least satisfied with safety 
c onditions within the plant. Paint dangerous machine s and 
and have lighting facilities checked annually t o make sure 
eye -strain does not add to the accident r ecord. 
As time passes and the Personnel Department becomes 
more familiar with the public rela tions function , open 
house s c ould be added, sports and recreational programs 
e n couraged , industrial movies made , and even a s ys tem of 
mu ltiple management attempted. A community relations 
prog ram could also be developed, the bumping-unemployment 
problem may even be tackled, public exhibits presented , 
and so forth until a rang-range public relations program is 
an actual entity at A. S. Ca mpbell Company 
II 
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At a time when free enterprise is under such critical 'I 
•I 
I 
I 
I 
i pressure stemming from foreig n shores, and when a t the same 
I 
:i 
I 
time highly-gea red adveriising , publicity,and p r omotional 
campaigns in this country laud free enterprise, this 
:I 
investigation seems to have uncovered a contradiction in jj 
--jj-
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American economic philos ophy. Common knowledge tells us 
that small business firms , such as A. S. Campbell , are the 
backbone of free enterprise, yet, here is a small business 
that has failed to realize its full potentialities under 
just such a philosophy. The author cannot say that A. S. 
Campbell Company is perhaps all to o typical of free enter-
prise. Nevertheless , he can say that A. S. Campbell and 
its ~ack of human understanding does n ot present too sound 
an example of free enterprise which could be used to 
confute foreign ideologies. 
Perhaps in the future, and as the result of a well-
organized public relations policy, A. S. Campbell Company 
may become a fitting example of small business operatin g 
under the free enterprise system . 
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E A R N I N G S A N D F I N A N C E S 
DIGEST OF INCOME ACCOUNT, 
CONSOLIDATED AFTER 1943 
(Year ends December 31) 
1947 
1946 
1945 
1944 
1943 
1942 
1941 
1940 
1939 
1938 
1937 
Net 
Sales 
$ 
9,720,060 
7 , 072,943 
6,405,906 
Net 
Sales 
$ 
7,449,295 
4,858,142 
5,749,893 
2,000,080 
1,683_,360 
1,222,731 
732,025 
1,033,215 
Net 
Income 
$ 
258,390 
108,669 
134,040 
Net 
Income 
$ 
254,954 
182,510 
164,011 
113,574 
91,414 
155,854 
25,523 
94,629 
CONSOLIDATED INCOME ACCOUNT, 
Ending Dec.31 · 1948 
Net sales .... o o ••••• o • • $10,760,356.00 
Cost of sales ····•• o ••· 
Gen 1 1. Adm. o ••••••••••• . 
Oper. Income .... . ..... . 
Other Income .......... . 
Total income ·· · ·· o • o •o• 
Taxes on Income .... . .. . 
Adj.of previous taxes . . 
Interest paid ......... . 
Misc. deducts ........ . 
Profit on sale of assets 
Net income ......... , 0 . . 
Pfd. dividends ..... . .. . 
Com. dividends . . ...... . 
Bal. after div .... . .. . 
9,210,239.00 
846,306.00 
703,811.00 
33,675.00 
737,486.00 
282,000.00 
25,533 . 00 
4,634.00 
3,705.00 
429,024.00 
39,547.00 
74,690 . 00 
314,787.00 
Earnings per share 
$2.50 pfd. ......... .... $27.63 
C ornmon .•..... o •• o o • • • • • 4 . 4 3 
Earn/Sh. Com. 
t2.50 Pfd. 
15.46 
$ 
2.46 
6.40 
-73 
7.45 1.30 
Earn/Sh. 
$ 
2.97 
2. 20 
1. 98 
1.44 
1.17 
2.00 
.33 
1.21 
YEARS 
1947 
$9,720,060.00 
8,403,941.00 
869,007.00 
447,112.00 
39,294.00 
486,406.00 
178,000.00 
17,981.00 
27,322.00 
10,596.00 
5,883.00 
258,390.00 
42,265.00 
32.975.00 
183,175.00 
$15.46 
2.46 
Based on following shares: 
Preferred .............. 15,529 
Common . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87, 87~ 
... 
16,711 
87,871 
53 
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET, December 31~ 1949 
Assets 
Land~Bldgs. & Equip. 
Less Res. for Depr. 
Land~Bldgs. (net) 
Orders in process 
Investments 
Prepayments 
Current Assets 
,Cash 
Accts. & nts. rec. 
Inventories 
Cash Surr.Val.Life Ins. 
Adv. to salesmen~etc. 
Total Current Assets 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
$2. 50 Pfd. (no par) 
Common stock ($1 par) 
Treas. stock 
Long Term Debt 
Cap. surplus 
P. & L. surplus 
Current Liabilities 
Notes Payable 
Accounts Payable 
Tax reserve 
Accruals 
Total Current Liabilities 
Total Liabilities 
met Working Capital 
13~025 
64~535 
592~235 
1~483~913 
936~901 
111,092 
2~513 
$3,127,491 
4' 901', 32'4 
$814,368 
87,871 
dr. 17,752 
285,146 
1,242,057 
1,123,380 
386,756 
398,265 
408,907 
172,326 
$1,366,254 
4,901,324 
$1,761,237 
1947 
$2~644;615 
948~987 
1~695~028 
22~204 
13~025 
65~856 
328~831 
1,249,418 
1,250,536 
110,288 
3,073 $2, 942,146 
4', 736,260 
$852,261 
87,871 
dr. 4 
374,000 
650,692 
1,393,021 
542,000 
335,430 
282~433 
220~556 
$1,380~419 
4~738,260 
$1,561~727 
Orders on hand~ December 31, 1948~ ammounted to approximately 
$975,000 for the Campbell division and $837,000 for the 
Hunt-Spiller division . 
. -. 
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T~IX., 1 ., ~u· D!lOlm)~ X'~a~,,tl,;,ri·r~ .... .,. A. 5o O~"!,lPBELL {10 ., 1 ~0. 
D'tl·r:;1ilflg the par~t tb& al!l m.on'@ihs tle lmv® been f"0:<.9ced ~o lay off CZl r.aleaeo 
o~~;xo1gl1'¥l ~ ove~" fou~ h'\J1.J.-1dr~d of ou~ emplo7~ea :toll laok of wo~,:t . 'tb.:l iD ~~Th= 
-l~.ldea no·fi only faotoey work·a~e, but also oleflioal " teol'mical e.n, 0Xe.;....,. 
~'t1ve pa~aonn01 .. To you employees who a:re still working and ,c ·th" rur.; · w 
@mploys0e who a~0 laid off~ this message 1s direct d. · 
Wa feel that you a~ entitled to know the situation that you~ Ccmpa · 
f.ind3 i tselt m at this time, so that we may see if there 1 e,ny wev 1· 
Which -we might wort ·togethex- to bring Jobs back into this plaJt\t,. 
During the past throe months:~ we have lost one-halt of our nomal btts i-
m. QS . Th1a, ot ooul"'e, means one-halt of 70ur Jobs. We l"a~ ~be Clu7-
glel' businoes ?J ~. . epresenting about one-th1l?d of youzt Jobo. Wo l oa' 
23vera.l l&i'ga lS49 eontl:"ac·t;s because ou~ oompet1 tors wsr a·ole ·~c eu.b-, , :t; 
'b.\da ~ubata.ntially below ours. Finally, our cuetome~G have meld d~m·1tio 
_ cal'lcella.ti!ma and cu·ii-OO.ckG, paFtioulal'l7 of se:rv:loe o:ztdeN. 
Wh~t ia t he reason fo~ this auddan d~p 1n the volume of our bu6ineas? 
Vih;r oans t we compete and get ordel'B from ous.tomers who have given H 
all theil" business ovei- a per, .. od of res~? The a.nawsr oanno·~ be t lw:t; 
thewe i~ no longer a ma~ket for our products. It is a fact t~~t ote · ot 
oul'l largest competitors :La now rtmn1ng at full plant capaoitr end ooa 
mo:.1?e btat~!nesc than he ce.n handle. It is significant to note tl1at he 1~ 
·~hf.l man who t ook the Chrysle1" business away from us! 
f!'o )~aa:r-n the anewe:r to t.b.a above ques tion~ , the writer made raSJ 0X'al trip" 
to our custom{~rs to see what theil' reasons were for oancell1ng Ol'd ~s . · 
He found that the A. a. Campbell Company no longer haa the rapu~ation 1 
onoa enJoyed for turn1ng out quality produota at reasonable prioe • 
Everywhe~e the writer went he wao told the same story: 
"YoUI' qual1. ty 1s bad. 1 
"Your delive:ri.es are bad." 
"Your pr1oes are out of line." 
These ouatome~ actually showed the Writer samples of bad wel~~ng-b d 
pl ti11g-bed fin2.sh .. oaraless packing--and records of repea.fiod detaul ~s 
on delivery eohedules . These are the reasona. they give# 1n additi on to 
th.o question of' price, a.s to why ~hey are ta.k1ng business away from \il.e 
and giving it ·Go OW' compet1 tors. 
vn:,.']1t doat:J th1a mean to you and your Jobs. It means that we b.eve a f'e 
careless worJters who are endangering t he eeou:r1ty of all our tvor1tGr • 
'le cannot hold our bue1neaa and provide Jobs for our workers so long ao 
:·tn:t ~ oondi tio!l ex1$ta . 
If yo1.1 really want job secu:ri tr, th1s 1s no t1n1e 'iio listen to those !e . 
~ong you who are s till urging JOU to skimp on qual1tr~-11m1t p:roduo~1o~~ 
..;.spr.-a&d the worlt . This is the worst possi ble way to protect your j ob O.!> 
to· get the four hund~ed workers at1ll on layoff back to work. 
'!. u ~:ln·~nr: ~1:;:.~ i.s o ...... otJ ;,: .!'l . .;, <Dvor-y ~)'!> ~·lli bl~D effo:~·· 1. to ·S ') i ~oil::: '~· :;...0~ <• ,;'•q 
'··hi""' ~:;J.en.';;. Wo [-l.T:"Cl ~ .. nvo~ ,:'tng hea ~.i.~< ;J.;~ ne~l o. !j26•·xu~ 0 ·iJool.a B.J"ld 1." :.? ii'l 
m1. all ow~ et:?o:Y'~ ·;;o r otle.ptur''' 't~L 1) .~o~Jbin. r'i~.:?k·~'(;. We ~.1·0 b~dcl'~ng ::n 
C . ;-:., r;~J. la.l"gf;J Ii2£!UlV..ftM3tU.~ti:Z.: ~ S Coli·rj;;;:ac .~ r·•Lloh OOU1ld ti!\93.'1. 30170:\"C.J .. hu;:lUY.'G•'l 
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<~ob&: Ii'l an s.J.1 Ol1lYt '<.J~"fol"t to go~ii 1 o~k~ ·ce .~~e now quotirag pr.icoe ff' 6f; 
b,.J.ov; those f..l\.-'!.oted ·"·lu"a0 mon'lihs a.go. In doing 'ilhim c we ara n.o pro:~oc," :il.::!) 
~o r· rJ.u.Qf;; ym.~i!l \ . ag~a. Xnste~tl p 'f:T<3 e,r•a our',t :l.ng o~.~ pl"'ofi ~ mB~.~· n ·t;o ··~h.tl 
:x>~.!hi r.hG:."s i'ii act ually enflange! l"~t!J 'Ghe s~ouz-1 'Gy of th, ·cu!31. ~mcul. 
Wo ar0 doing all t hia to ~x,- to provide emplo;yment fo~ ol.U"t T~orke~s ,s,fi·1 to 
k~ep this plant i n ope~ation . · 
Ao P:i?es ide~:t of this Company, I feel t hat we hava mo:t'e at c; t alte than ~> 
Tow buj.ldingo and machines . . We have here an i nves tment in h~n btlil-nga 
and Jobs ... 1n ht'.man ak1lls and exps:rienoe. 
How much tl\i you value yourself? How much do ;ro1J val u e you:-.• j ob 
Wo M ""'S a l:i. seen what happened at the Waltham Watch Company. Are you 
going t o wait until the key is turned. in the front doo~ unt i l you ~oali~s 
~hat£? you too , have a personal responsibility t o -keep this busineao-=rr i:-.1 
btts1n.ess ~'I 
W~ emnnot urge t oo strongly that you who are et111 ~on the Job 0 p1toh iu 
NOW ~ Gi ve us the quantitJ and quality of work we mua t have to keap o1.w 
OTci Cl2.Stomera, and to get new business into this plant. Gat a f t er the 
f $l l ow who tr1ea t o squeeze bad o~ border l ine work t hrough the line. A 
Job don0 almost right 1a WRONG. I t may ge t by the i nspector & but !t will 
not g~t ~cuatome~! 
De your job and do 1 t well, not only for yours elves fJ but for t hosG .mploY··· 
o~fi1 who have los t t he1:r Joba. Do i t t or thei r :?a:m111em ~ho a~e auf ell!· ... €£ 
i;h · lm.;~d~Jh1p of t his long l ayoff. 
Xo~:lf' msne.ger~®rr~ will continue t o fight fo r mor e work. Ws will cont~ .. nu 
to c;ut oosts and pr of1'i;3 unt11 we oan bui l d th1a business baok to th~ 
loa · ~rship and r eputation for quality and r e11ab1l1ty 1t enjoyed fc~ so 
ffii..~y ~?Ga.~ e W0 oa.nnot clo 1 t a l one! You must do rour sha:r ~ 
Wo ex~;~;rnd. ·to our employees still on l ayoff and to t heir :ram1liea 0 ouA" 
aino.a:rs gympa t hy 1n your pz•esent diff:loul t i es., Our oa:mea ~ hopa and lJ. 
o~r eff'orte @ ..r e bs j.ng di!."ao ted to :retu1'n1ng you to work a t t he 5a:f'J.' ee t 
potHJibla ·ti ma .. 
Vl:'l:~h you:v help; we hop~ 1n the·. fut'l!l'le" to e stablish a nd mai ntain ~ y &i1 
n:.n;t'IM'! w job secuz•i t y fol'~ al.l ou:r WOl:1ker-s . 
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.-
A. S. CAMPBELL CO., INC. 
INTER-OFFICE COMMUNICATION 
Datea 
' SUBJECTs. 
Ter' 
I • ~ 
' ::. 
....... 
. , .... 
·'· 
. t .l )0,~ .. known to 8~e:ry (.l~f:l of Citl..)'.'" ~,mpl..:~y-:Jee t.be.t. this Oon:rpaey r .:\6 l·HI !; a 
l -~· J . ~ h '·.o: U SS during th~ paa·t :fC..ltt1: d .. (lg ·tro O~)~anized ~l~wdowno '¥ D. :ro.y Oi OU.l" G~ ;)~~ 
1'l" (..:Jl:9r1 y n ee"·tain group of POJ,!SHFJ!S p,nd tl\f.r' .· :_:;_:·"~· .'md t ~·B -p· :rs:le t<,}nt r~tttus .... ,J 'J f ~-h::; 
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, . .... ·._,. i,,_:, .;--:h·- .rus $ . . ... 1 \fr;yu WOl'Kg Ol' fl.~~P.Yl't rr>~.:~~Ut.;t, .. !'H~:t thol.lgh thoy ilo ( . .;•, ~- ~g \,y 
la.' \-!•. h. ! :-~1t.5t ~UJUl'ljf ~l'lf;"> ').~dd i:n thi!a '!1') ,"ld~ 1 l~fl'~.i:"U~n;·~ i':r'Otn ;~1_, f:lf· 1;o ·~'2 ... 0{) "f-~C. h{il.l'! 
' ... '.!;. n~'i. .:--ve ;.t~>Jn. ttu9 •!rh~t.f·y i:o.-utiga.t~f.'~ o·r· :n·, >:~:t ~J:f t\ ·~- h<bo r· tr-t.U tl:! e thla -pL,·nt k,, 
n,_ t1 iii'··· ·"'"' ·;,; tw<il y. \\ll''S . 7: '1e1 ar··e th~ e'hlt!i~ r~H ··~•"..i .• ;;.~·:\ ·'·l"~ ov t1'-f:t'P. k· .. ~ .... 
, .... ,r·q .j 
:u. . ']" ~· 
~-·· t t' J o .r ~.x1.~-' 
:r. } 1 t11!:. ·;:• 't"'<A. ' 
lot,'!< -~iu'...··s · "i'lie;>h !:t~ :•~w 
'i".H;:rf x•~;; \lr€16).D.ting 12' •:,. 
. ~-::. t~ t.·!,tl' -~, · ·r.,., ... ·~; !cr~· Y'l-·f\1"11 ., 1'\•t' !·Xf.O!ti··i.~. 
!' l)"J..l" t.1170\j ;-: 'il"!• .: to~.nd ~~ • .; l.u"~ ·'It :f'tmTl,i .1~'.'·' 
'1/· .. !: ;.._ ~ .. t(', J'or f-1-~ tbOl.'Jt '!>tl•~ 1~4~ 1;:l.;r'{lsl.i~ :joi1't ~·tJ r '•A"~"-t~ .• · ~ .. r.."' t·'f;" .. c~·IH .. H" bUt•i :(!~; .i!\V.(l -~.ti 
J,.,·,L ·r A?vttf!. 12{~ uf y->Ou-r jc1b ~ 
.,,, .> t\:~~-« ·~:ri'i':.:;;i F$1ii!:trt ~"1, F~t.'k~x-d eiild. ~in:~JF'fil1~.r· .·:e·.v~t,,·~: .;;.~Lr l:oalt! &nd :1~· ,,;r,_,,. 
$c•..l''-~t ). },.\ 'ii\H i:d lJ>I:. tfUl :'!,'J:~U..o,d~ that. if <)XU:· ~M'~'•'l ~' i!lg •!'l '~:t d Jil(}l; dr. !ftl3i'!' IIIM"k,, l:lC~~~·?cX.Al' 
.. , ··;c;nii•l. l'hi.~ t·oprettt 1li'i'tti t.h£l l1.i:aa u.f· ·i~ '!"?~ i;i)$.Q ... ,,.., : :j-{' .ft:iltl. j•Jb .. 'I''I'>..rcc; . Ul:lf)'r:. ¢til" 
'·. eo.· li '( p·,,sft. 'GCH:l!J..S bi.iV8 left th~ -p:t~.ut ~n(~ !'!{r'!! ~··8}·~ CJii. - ~·: , •. 1,-r ~!':!Y to i;lteir dttlilt·i:l~, · t>;~ 
~ f:~L., l ( 1'.1·"' t an· :.~41on o:m-p~gandt~. yr.ru. -~~'8..1 h_ .. ·l\ll!' to. tl· t: ~(Hll<~'lt:ry, 
lli~I ~~ ~i.~:.Ji:tti~k .... :,_ .J,:Ifr 
~·~·. ·' is l:l :fiJ;ht:ln~~: chrua~()l of gett..ing ::lt.•"~''il t~ :"~lJ ·,·~],.·~ of t,, ta u,.:!nN!lS bacl.: in thG ple •. t, 
bt.\ ... r:tl·:· • ~- :aoo>." ·.-·.n coop~Tate ...,S,t,h us _c~.-:. t'IU''n. 11-tc .. t.tJ · '(lTe<duc:Uor·. Mt quality Wt'l mll~t 
h • ;.;. t, ~ >1.1-p thti) bu~>i.ne,;,;s §.~ you. '4iU&t a·~..t·.\t , t~U:;t; 1:,[> ;;, ~:bti':Tt(l faet.n,1 e· en i.f th. stir1.kw 
T:t.,£·d ·:t·da;y~ there are at lealt'lt 525 ell .plt~,r4'1 .!.t! '18 C.<Hln~t rmt l;aek to wrk:,, '.l'lw 
; ! ~eop··., w· c~m employ wiJ.l di!Jl> l&tl on now .w1 wn~t,~Hl~ ·-,fl ca!t 1_:(1t l;lv; h11S:int3Elf! a ~ 
(.t-HJ :· o qui:.h all'~t:'t wb~1t.hsr o.r· v.ot• yo1i l~~.'lrfll n~ ~ '.i t"ai:r- {tny:'f:! Wll'' c: fer s fail' day 11 c tlS:'~ 
., ' 
!£!~ T .1~'L . .l1l;~'f!.:~~ ~-~lf'l~.,~:Q. .. i~;.tK ~J!!Hi_? 
. :;~. •:1••:;:~ LdJJ:ir. t..h I·e·•a ti<':lthi.nlf. left bn.'1' th b;al:C:> bon e :rnr thf?l 1Ju~.on to t,'l'\..' 1 o ~n\:1 
.t\. ~ t! 0 '.f?:_. ~ 1.! 
b:'l phone :.J.nfl_ me.U to nur lP-tte?e, Your honest e:x:pl~ession of oninton A-9 to an;r stat t"!men 
mado in -h8S€: letters is both t-relcome and. apnr;3ciated. at acy t 1.me a 
-~--- - ------- ---·------··--~--,---·---
" u a1~e no'.t tvell into tt:.e fourth week. of '1-Jha looks like a. 'P:t'olonged strike. 
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though ~ as we have already told you i n -previous letters~ 1:!AGBS are not the real issue in 
this strike. '"e have -pre-pared for your information, a table showing how long it tfill tak~ 
y-ou. to regain '\!Iages you lose during the strike, NO MA'l1!,§B . .'~0 \JUIS QUI' ON THE',_...9.YEST!OU O~'-
liM!.m2.· 
c~--------------------------------------- ·-------·-~- -·-------·--~ 
The average hourly \'Jage in this r>lant , taking in all classes of labor , male and femal"' • 
nrior t o the strike was $L58 an hour. The Coama.~· has offered fi.ve cents an hout" in= 
crease . The Un1on ,_.,ants something between that figu.re and f:.llav~.n cents an hour ~ncrease, 
' 
-.... ~.~-------·---
ASsuming ;:,1 ther side -prevail a , 'AI'e show below how long you will have to t.rork to catch u-p 
w1 th the money you are losing while you are on strike. 
IF STHIK3 LASTS If you acceTlt Company off~r of 5¢ Even if you recetve 11¢ 
Twelve w~eke 7 xears & 3 months r= 3 yea.!:!_ & 4 UlQ!\.~11! _ ·-
_E!ft~en w~eks __ ~------~9~lAars & 1 month ,_-r-l_4~zr:..:e~ars & 1 ~ ... Q...J!th ___ . 
------~~---~~rs & 2 months Six months 15 Years & 8 months 
EJj}URE IT _ OUT FOR YOURS~F. 
For every d.a¥ 5 8 -pay loe·t. "'1th a fiv~ cent a.n hour i ncrease, 
you will have to work over SIX WEEKS to regain that ONS DAY*S PAY. 
&.'Yen with an eleven cent increase. you would have to work almost 
THRmB \·lEEKS toge~back OTJ'E Dfi.Y' S PAY lost while on etrike t 
pooaow many day•s pay have you already los t? ooo:aow lll8n1' mora a.re you goi ng to lose! 
-----~--··---------------------------------· ---··--· The Union put you 0on t he street« 
Think it. ov€r and r·emember 
I . ::, 
' .. 
·•m 
..:J. J, .. ' 
---- :...-
:rH.l. ·l l l b@l 11 m~~t 1n~: \l":f your Union a.. l-!.,r1di n Hall. , .Lf>3 M. r .U .A S t:r\!1.,~, Eae 
:.h. ;:.1.'1\l.l.··d • s~-ptembftT 4th,, a 10 ,-30 A. M. o f.l.J ne .d er ·h Oc11np ny'' !!:... _1, fr,; 
t)r; t ~ ;. 
'r·'l.J. 
"f .;>U-:' 
ln "'· 
the ix weeks of tb.il etri.k~® w~ b.avA r·~o~=JiV@d a gr ti!ying re r.xme 111 ft.;.ll! 1 .. 1' d. 
enrol ye""' v ho a.ppar.,n t ly have bAen 11atiafied wH·h the wagef! a r:d working o· .u~i 
ol An.t . 
WE URGE THAT EVERY ONE OF YOU ATTEND THIS UNION ME~TING 
·11,., e. .... a .. } a ek t hat. i nnuad o f ~he ' Voice Motion~ and 11 Show u f HMdsi· ' ;hat br·:Jugbt. Ml u.' 
hh etTik_; against t he wish8B of many employefJtl 9 you irt!.hJ. t hat a seer~>.~ Au.fltl aL.!ll: 
b~ll. l. be t aken on t he queetion of acceptance or rejection of' the Company•· ~ final \Jtfe:. 
Th r.. ·;!' :c~ot~JUiH,Y i nclude• your deohion aa t o vheth~r ,you vant t.J x·e htrr~ "'-' work ·->· 
•!'J 1Unu~ t.h h s tr-i ke , ln a d6&dlook which 1110 1 t p robably will nev~Jr be broken,, 
THIS lS THE COMPANY• S POS I TI ON 
Wh .L ~ man ap-pltl't l for a job anyvb.~tr tt . he ueuall;r aske ~ '1Wha ; am 1 fiU'p"PO!H~d to d. ? 1• 
anc vtb"· much will I be pa1 d't '1) 
H ~:'CP'i ·U the Company t o hl l h im vha t th8Y wan t 
he 1.11 nnt !Sa.tis'fit<!d,. he dofl!tl no ·!: take thf'l Job , 
\.l.ld t ~ll t he CompaDJ• how mu.oh work he vil l do ~ 
t.aJ ___ S!,&,:!_'!£!.~ for fLt!-i T 9N' ~ a gaz. 
h i m tQ do for tht; wa ~~e t.h~y p ay .. 
CArt ainly h~ doesn~t think t hA t he 
so l ong a• th~ Co~yft~ ~&~UiTe~ ~filY 
~------·----· -.. --~_,_...-- .... .-.--~.- , 
Th~ l'· ubl~ h Wiha~ 18,.2.,~_!_ the Union thinks ll should l ei th~~t s t a ndard of ....:'O'rk., 
: . ·\4 taki11g e:wfJ¥ manag1' ment t 1 :fund.amen1tal righ t to run tb.e Plant an d eoh~dule t!1~ wa k. 
Th" Unl....n turth~r he.e .,ncouraged and condoned 91lowdo...,n t l1 ae a labor Vlllapon, A .l. reklu. 
· h iH 0orrrp~ny hal l oet over one-halt' of its but1D!I! Sfl - hund:r ~~tde of employ "l eU her~" "• he~ · 
"'h ·lfu ~·ui ) f work and t h., final 'r68Ul ~ h t hh long etrike -. 
I S IT ANY WONDER THAT WE DEMAND THE RIGHT '1'0 SEt' OUR 
STANDARDS OF WORK WITHOUT l NT.ERFERENCE BY THE UNI ON? 
We :r.~~.,tu,J __ }L. dtt~mand t h e right to oont.rol \9lovdovn• ., We t1f!11t...tl!l13: r19tuse t.;. ·;,' to 
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~k n~ p~rfo ~ed unl eee the fault l ies with ~he Company and not th~ emn oyee , l th~ 
~t~r t' !! :....,. t:~e uill guara.nte~P. the wo:rkero ~ batH'l rate~ :ll:n .0.1) ;:pVent w!.ll w tt p e..v ~~ wo.rk:t:J< 
~· •:o ttnn !l ~ B.Otually ~~arns down ·J;G a m1n1mwn of 80~ an hour. 
WE WILL GIVE YOU THE RI GHT OF APPFAT ~ 
"' :.s ·v a wclown t>l" aa ~* t h fai r n Ms {tf ot..r ttl'lnMI''rlfi w:Hl b , subu.l ~ ;(; 
--:. -. ·m:t.>:ido'1 tu·bitr ';o · ~ho o e f ind ngo will ba 11.n<:H.nr,, ~n !x,~h ·'ho tm. · l'l· 
i:t h~ :fl1 ds •,;h ~vpa~· t. tau.U , WE W! L.L P l BAC PAT TO A lUST .Ul ~HRc / 
· ~ :l .. 
.-e_m~j·~ t~ t.o confirm .. :to~l no•i;ica given t() the Ut!~on S~c:Pctacy- a-n.d Auti!ig 
~kl:~. e.t" S ~e;varttp Staruey Koehocki as ot Januaz.y a, JJ~4:8 'i;iC iille · a:f'f'eot t.'l:lat 
'l.;hex•,e will. 1!a lay...;of'fs tl'l...rougJ:lou·i; t.h.e I\few Building :l.n aJ.l Depa:pt:ments;t anf 
o:n all ahif'Gs etfec·t3:ve at the and o'l each shift Janua~;.v 9 8 1948 .. 
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·-Wnis !:.e#y-c::k~f' .:.a a direct resuJ. t of a slow down ln production wh.1.ch. lw.s be~"'! 
ma.:~,rri'iained by ~he employees in the Ne'!f;r Btl:l.lding :• partioular1y th!$r Bt.t?i,e3•s · 
~il'h:'i.gh ~s crea"t;ed suoh a bottleneck in production in this Pl.EU"l'i:tt ..... ba .. r:; we at; a; 
Ul'Mr~ble "GO p:l?operly schedule p~:ooductior.t and wo:t"k has p1led up i n ·the l~u.f:?.'ing 
Room so that we have to lay<;.'OoX'f' othe:r employees. 
Me.nagement wants to emphasize a:t this point that the employees who are re-=-
sponeible for this cond.i tJ.on and this slow down 9..n. prod.t~.ction, hE.va done a · 
:foi? ~~e purpose o:f ·trying to obtain favorable piece \VO~k ratea instead of 
waiting for the ou.tcome of gnevanoe procedure and al"bit:t"ai;ion p:;....,ovided fo"":J> 
i . the Union contract., The · employees have in many case~ ztefused to a.ot.lep (; 
ilf~dards which have been agreed to by the1:r~ own Union timestud:yma.n and heV$ 
Pef'u.sed to work on these standa:t"'ds ancl have gone on ~work as a means ot 
·~ry:ng to foroe Management to put in a rate more favorable to them. This i 
a :flagi>ant v~.olat1on oX the Oontl'aot J.~eement between tbe Union and Manage ... 
flen.a·~ ~to !ettle al.J. d1spu·tes by grj.evanoe and arbitration .!?,nl;r:> and b;y ~10 
the1.· me vhods o 
Tha slow down 3.1, produot1on is dif':feren·~ in dagrae only to a sitdown~ wol!.;. 
stoppage, or st~ke and wnan the Union membersrepaat~v go on day v~~k t o 
obt~.n their• ends and to toroa Management 1nto oompr•omis,ng pieoe wo:t"k ~&e 
regaroleaa of timestt.\dy and the actual. merits o:E' the oase: then rvrana.gement 
holds the Union responsible and maintau1s tpAt this stoppage has been ~o er~ . 
e ted, condoned~ per.mitted: enoouragad, and participated in6 not only b~ Un1o~ 
membe~ 'but by atall'raros and um.on Offioars. 
~ . . 
Me.na.gemen·i:i insists that the Union con tmct has been broken by the Union a nd 
ls seriously oonaidering taking the pos1t1on that the Union bas no fUr~he~ 
~ig!lte under the Contt'act. one position we will oarta.inlt take in -regal'de . 
to these lay ... offs, is that no emplo7ee or group of employees who has patt<q . 
·tiaipated 1n~ and t'lho is responsible fo~ slow ctowns will, be given the bene:fi " 
o:f' sani.ori ty :rules and allowed t o worlt while innocent employees are .laid o'l'K o : 
Managemen-t wi.J.l not e.l.low 'iihe Union to bJ:-aeak the Oont!-aet a:nd then demand · 
sanior1t;y rights unde~ the same oontl"ao't., For this reaeon0 it we b.ave la.;r..,. 
o:f:f's 1n the New Building where this bot·tleneck has materialized~' we w~~ll not 
1 v o:ffmen 1n the Old Building where this condition doee no·i; ens·t at the 
. resent timee 
I f and when ·f;he 'UP..ion demons·t-"..,.ates that 1't has contro~ over 1ts O:f't.>ioers~~, 
S11~wards ancl l~embership and decides to put a final stop to this bv.si.ness of 
~law downs 3 a.nd going on day work at the caprice o~~ the employeea, anu 
· e 
. .../ 
To~ All Supervisors\ 
Bulletin Boards~ Subject~ December:~ . 194? Clocked Jou r1 e Cards 
All piece workers who are required to clock in and out on job time 
cards are hereby reminded that they are held strictly responsible 
for the correctness of the time they show on these Job cards. Such 
employees must clock in at the start of the operat1on .and clock out 
at the finish of the operation as previously ine·truc~ced, both by 
supervision and by written notices. 
No employee will be excused from this responsibility on the ground 
that he 11 :f'orgot 11 or that he was prevented from eo doing by any other 
o1rcumstanoeo This company will not pay the employeeon a piece iOrk 
or incentive basis unless this order is complied with strictly . 
There has been many abuses and violatbna of the above orders Which 
have made it necessary tor the company to take a very firm stand. 
A typical example is the following~ 
Many employees have deliberately manipulated the time on their 
Job cnrds so as to obtain make-up pay on a rate which they do 
not like by transferring the time they had spent on another 
Job. When they are asked to account for this, the usual excuse 
is they "forgot" to punch in or out at the right time. The re-
sult.is,thatJob cards show absolute 1mpossib1lit1ea where em-
ployees claim to have done the work that could never have been 
done in the time indicated on the desirable rate, and waich show 
that they have taken more time than is reasonable under any cir-
cumstances on the und.esirable rate~ This 1sJust as much . 11 cl.ipping,.. 
as turning in false counts and the company will not tolerate this 
practice any longer. 
The company will take one or more of several steps Where they t1nd 
employees turning in false time:; 
1. The company will pay the employee on a day work basis tor 
the entire day where they show false or impossible timee 
and will accept no excuses. 
2 . Employees who persist in putting incorrect time on their 
Job oards w.lll b discharged. 
All Supervisors, Production Control Clerks and the PaJroll Depart-
ment are hereby instructed to make oaretul oheoks to see that all 
employees who are required to punch Job cards do so at the correct 
starting and stopping times ot the respective operations. 
oc~ Messrs . Axford 
Potter 
Wylie 
Maloney 
D. St. John 
P. E~ Eitmant 
Union 
File 
-· 
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A P P E N D I X C 
PILOT QUESTIONS FOR EXECUTIVE INTERVIEWS 
No. l 
General background : 
How long with the company? 
What is your job? 
What did you do before you came here? 
What is your educational background? . 
(l) Who do you believe determines policy in this company? 
(2) Who do you believe determines labor policy in this 
company? 
(3) Does the company have a formal PR program? 
(4) If so, what is that program? 
(5) What do you think, in general, of the labor movement 
in the United States? 
(6 ) What do you think of your plant labor force? 
(7) What is your opinion of Local 262? 
(8) What are the communications between management and 
labor? 
(9) What do you think can be done to improve them? 
(10) Have general business trends affected or will they 
affect your labor policy? 
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II 
I 
. PILOT QUESTIONS FOR EXECUTIVE INTERVIEWS 
No. 2 
General background~ 
How long with the company? 
What is your job? 
What did you do before you came here? 
What is your educational backgnNnd? 
(l) What is the most important problem faced by your 
company 
(2) Do you think general business trends have affected 
or will affect your labor policy? 
(3) What are the communications between labor and 
management? 
(4) What do you think of your plant labor force? 
(5) What is your opinion of Local 262? 
" 
11 ( 6) Who do you believe determines labor policy in this I company? 
: (7) What do you think~ in general~ of the labor movement 
in the United States? 
(8) Who do you believe determines policy in this company? 
(9) Does the company have a formal PR program? 
il ( 10) If so~ what program? 
!1 (11) Do you think an increased budget for an educational 
program would be of value? 
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II 
I 
II 
tl 
I ' \- I .!. •• C ~ -~,. .. y-_~l - T' .C~ ::-' ... ~~-:. }~ u:__l~(~ CJ; ~_:_ j_~': "1-~.:;I~S - 8'~- c.. ~., ~-,. --:_8 ~\ .. ~~-~
1_0- ~.,:J 
2-~J.·t..~ i C.-:c.:.t ~--.1~ \.~ -~;~:..2- -~~ ~-·. t.:: l_;_~~-e . 
(0) ITo ::-l-c .tlJ..·u ~·j: fm - ::10 :·:~T s i::'.: ~J.t.ec.1 o.uci. l' l <::l~:r.:.s C. 1':..'0().:·c .. m 
n:;:_,, . or neces[:r:.:cy evil , :-.D l~e ul, ~ -c ss·1 
.. DC.l!:l ' t l e C'.ll 0 \lfJ l , lJ 2. C ~C\"JC.I'(l S :f 01· ·tl'"ieL~ , j U. s t~ ;-::;o l ClJ.g 8 8 t,Jle~,r 
u or}:. 11 
Eo I; 1 EcY6r ounc1s , no .::_;e2~c r ,:: l c c t i v i ties fal~ enp _nyse s , JJO 
out .i.n~e , n o co:-m!nnity T· e J. c~t im·w. 
(5) For uni onisn 
P a st f e'.: months , ~-enor c:;.l t 8nClency to harder ;.mr lc , Y'!Ol'e o r 
:::;Gne 1)l"Od.uction for omn.e or l os s r cvJ:::.l ·d 
Unen.1~ l oy:;• ent sc c::.re c orrie1~ it a l ong but not st nrting 
l' eo.son . 
D r-.c- l·c·· , -.1 -' o· .l. ~,-, 0'0 -"'C" l"' o·· n~r,n -.•p,-., -=- -1-'- -~s -:·ell ,~s l '-' lJor ~- .... ,.J Lt.l _L l_ u_L. b v L -- J. ..... c. __ ( __ 0 _.~,_c.L.U ,_ \} -- - _._ , t._.:. 
Good vre..y of do inc; busi ness · 
Be c -:-.u s of i...mion i sm , \•lO:c1.::-::c l":.D.2 los·c i ncLi ri (t:r::.li S!!i ::ll.Q 
.,,:!.e.na:rse!.'!ent no l or.:.ger sees vvorker n s ir.:.di.,,ic1u;, l lJnt ;:.s 
:-:.er1btji' ~J f GI'011lJ . 
(6 ) J:'lan~c u=.l-;_--:·~l r::.en f ,:; J..--;, .lcl1e t .. :~r.:t~ l_:'".)_:r." t , h()llest~ - .·c) L'~:eT·s 1"T i J_ :_ill·: 
-;~o O.o l1o:::~·c···t~ - :·o i·~: , iJ1_: -G :-~ -~- · u8 .Jc.ck ()Jr c c :t.· -;j.~: i:t::: c ·Gi·-- ---·-~-~ -..J ... -
~_-- lo·s·c -.:. s 1. r~1o :Lo ]_}_ o~d- .~: ~~-~-~::~ :c r:- 1 l'"i"E j__: ol icy tl 
( ·r ) u~ policy n ot good for p l cnt 
~·· --:.-~ c=c:.., . .t. Jo ~ic :y- [_~'- ~r~-~e:-:! f~ l_;-~ 
.._.~ j L- _c; ·c-u ~- j!·~i:r_~L, t.~l:3 J..~v [ J.'·-3 cu:::,.-_,1.-_ ~,..l ~C ~--c J..L.) llS , i ~·.:..cl~_~(:=lc__;..:.: ~.--c l·:~ s 
. ' 
'" I 
··:_:_;_~- -~-~·e1· , -:;.'\ 2.· J..4 --.:~--~ :_::~2.:, o :~0Cll -~i i.J8 \_r::· -c J1 ief Gll[;il.:.CCl~ , ::. __ i'i~O~ll~t:; ]_ 
=' ~-:C :: C -~ 01~ . C.:t.:C.. .- .:J C 5. 0 ·t: ' -~·1_ -t, , t~,i-;"7 1 8 - rr\~1_-~ (_y~ :-'_ . ~- =~- ~._: .--::. : 1.· 
C'l.!.. -· l l 
u (, _ -- ~uc:~ to , e 
~ l · .. : . -~es 
...... 1. 0 -~.:: 
8:·:..1C e ~ . . -_:.."'i~ , ~~.~-~-l· i:..~. J.# '--CC:!.'J.\j " l.~c ::_ o ll , l_-_l1=:_0ll c"'_~~c· := .... ·G:C_ ..!~rJ:·:·ls 
-''·-~r. . .:_ c:·'c:.~-;:, :.. .c"c:--;-t.,c d , nd.g e::-.t t o t:: j~O l icytt . 
Got c.• .. :e..y- it~l Lj:H·.t. thGy colJ_l(. , cl_ i c o··.··-~ - \. ~:r;:. tL.cy J.E,cl. to 
r_-·c:~J."lO.[:;e~--·ts llt~ Ti.8\:- ~) l: f;':lt;te:tJ. ·to:~et~:l:.r -;.-.- i·t il. l 2.bO:C" 
-="- iL _ ' _c~ 1"·2 ·, l:)l"E: C O~~-'l"l~r_1_ ~_ZliC -:~-~io1.~8 
·-~ .. ~ :.-~ i.v le ~----~l'=~<~ .. e·--:e irt ic~. :~;r ,-· o~Cl. , o::-cel:/L :to1.· -L~ll-· ·.-}!1 
--.~ .;.., , ..... .-. . -- :J2.· .... --- ·G =:_.,P·~::::·:. -. - ~!. ·' _2 _ _ ,'J ~-i~_ -'co : ·1.:es . : .. ..:.~-'"'~icE; - -~-:I:..: 'J ~ "! 
;~ {~ ,.:: :~ -·~l~C ~ 2 G. ....n_:.c 11 of t:_ is ~;, J..·:: 0:1 cl. ~· o -~ ·;_ 011 . 
_:'.. t tl.=~c t~-~~~") , r ~~ . ~. ,- -.·· ·:: .... ~. , r· .. - ~LJc~rt -,_c-I ·sol-:.1181 o~:Li. c·c l~ c.:J~e 
,. .... -~ rl 1-, . .-.~i- r-._ -·- T":""-l r-- -r: .-'f\· r\-.- ~ "' ·\-. ~~-
1 
· ' .... : .-. 
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( l) ~.J u~ o _;_ :;.'.C~i ~- ic'l1IC.l ly c1ct':l'!'!i :.es ~ licy 
~ -.~.v ~~~.LL· ~~--.; .;_1 :· 1 L .ll.C~;~:-- ~ · .. ::;ll·t :·1G2 ~~_:_:l~;::; :..s '""' - ~:_~.:)u.~- '1 - ~-:L~ c.-· i~v~~:t 
~::: J - 1': .. 11 
( 2) ~.7:::!lf.~;eJnc l,t ·c.::c.l11 
~~~.: d- iC. c:T~t ~~--.c-~~-lvb cl~~--j_l{_:-.:!S -. J it-~, c~~-~ I")~:;:L· e.!.:L·:-~~ .. -: · .. i C~- ·L~ · ~.:..: 
-;---- .L. SOl1.:· ... l =.\.J __ -- i--L_,-~ .. c: ___ -c ~-~-- -~. --_. _ :_~ ::..- (-; -:  L ~v o l_:_c y 
::1: · _ z l·~-: -:en·t I~c.:c.t.s :: llu ~:2L~ .-:• ::- ~- ::( o~- ~ o: \~_cc i0ic11 ~- -l-~j_lll 
... ~e i.Jz:.:ct:leJ.~ -c 
~) ~~- " :.L4 oll .. __ :- i·~~l ·t,l'le -~ i~:-~.Gn 
J - ar a l l -,::;lr:m 2.c -,Tlul s.t ec t!.Tl.'- -...::_~1.: tl~ i c.ls s.nc. e rl--o r s , \:·itL::..n 
c o::·11.E.ll' anc~ oth r co:-·\-:-.c n i es 
S'I·~ - ·0o ge t best f sc,_tur es 
Ilion ·-2. . -.'i.JS 1 est f cc;ctt:res il: con·i:;r: __ ct i1.cc;otic~tio::.::.s t;:l' y_·'.)l 
c.--.i11e lJi:.ocess 
( 5) OJ.c3. 8.lilli , if un '.on lS Yre ll-co~:c-G :col~-::.0. , it is 2. goo(t L~ing 
nc o.n 't decrec~se costs in plant, v,·i tl:otrt l~eo.uc L-t[~ cost of 
:-t2.e t~ cl , o r~ i:~:l" l~o .reel ~,:1et~hocl.s , t~lie~c e:roi e l., ~:;c1t~ciilb n-.~-~--. ":·O l" uf 
lJJ.en lZl ·t:he l o.bo1· fo:cc - 11 • 
( 6 ) 'l' llere 2,re :~oo d r- e l e.t lc.ms c l t~- ·'u.~·J:1 t~1e1~e cere :probL:rw. 
Union is c au s i n~; nost problems 
L~ost cnploye~~ s old - t:L-::1e l'S ; " i f tl1e::,• had not liked co:r:1:;_:c:.ny 
t}:.ey •.:.-ou l C:. not hc:.v e s t o.yod 11 • 
( ? ) nunion i s i:lOSt l '&cl i c c l of a ll Tl . 
(c) 
~o st ~enand s unf a i r fro~ ~ana~ement po i nt of v ieW 
i:~- 0.t io11r.l lJC:.·tter ns St:·; t UJ} by tln -i. Ol1 ~~ee.C~s e.nd inCor~iOl,r-·GE-)G. 
locally. 
COGJ)cmy c r:-::.1:!.-:'.0 t buck t i .d3 rnu.st foll.o•:r m.: it of ot_ler 
i n n~;u_ i 1e a ~~' ~G!~ • 
1JS.!..J2J~iC1S ::~.l so. 011 ,.Y,._18 iilDG S in r.s ":1I'J.Cl1 (_8 ·t::' .G L:~1-· C)r. L.C t~i rit,J-
t:ll\:.: CJ c ··i .. ..ll1S Cl..,e C,~T..t.C:.:<L1i1GC~ . 
Rot t~e e~ecu~i~c ' s j ob . 
It,' s ~=.:c. l ~:.>:~.::~ ~' ' ~: j ul;. 
!-·_·J.o~~ey z.s :._ :) :.icc:<'J.:-·J:J. <::":i' -- 1 :" ;:~P:._:'crv ·_:::;;~ 
- :..l J.~el ~~ ·c ..Lc' ils ~~~-:-)-: .,_ .:: , __ c · ·h .:~ t·;_. - -:: ~-~~ : .~ :t'. · "'"'":'"' 
t :=~-~-Lst ~::.:m·~ b o th c ide s o f c;._·,_,_ e _.,t ::".o::J. t 
~--~-l-,0 ~: vi: -:_· .) :~c~ -~~Q,.) .~. --: _;_:_-y- "' , ~{ -Ll_i'l:._Qr_J.tf • 
.}ob 
........ :... :~<Y ,A.... ., '_ .,_.~ -• C, (; 
"l..•e ~ l le to · . ·-11: to 
.. '_-[_, c,}- c t L'e , :Llf.: :.K _;e~:"e }.l.t -::.<:.~ E' :.-:::. }!:.,_r'tic :i..:._:; ~?,t c0. i n OI." 
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I 
I 
.-
I I 
L&0 o · c h·cul ~)_ t e- cl fi'OT-~ e:::::e c w~ lve t o e:::ecutive 2.!ld c;o t lJes t 
po ss i ble f' r6111 ~Jllom.ever t h ey coul d . 
Led to- c on fusion an~ u n f a i r n e ss . 
For cr.1en novv- ~- c: ndle r outine c o~c:_._-,unic at i ;n s :p _us gr :i.cvr n ce 
se t 1.,_p , betv;e en j_) e rsonn e l off i ce an c1 l a bor :L'orc e . 
( 9 ) "lee,r ned thin g s the h ar d vmy n . 
Only ha d P e r' sonne l Dep eT·tnent f i v c y e s_r s - 100;~ be t t e r 
Has t 8.J:e n I:luch · stuc1.y 
I 111pr ove s ev ery day - ma n a geme n t bett er e du c C" t e d 
nev entue.lly co:::12p ~rny vri~.l h c.ve 2s goo d l c_ O:L' r_. l :::_t i o :n s ns 
l)ast of th er:111 .. 
Un i on L 1;:_:_:, o l C. :' horse t ' G.d Cl" S !l - c. slc lJ.O:C e tl.!.G.!l ·c.:t e y r_; r l l ,~;e-
s et t l e f m."' le s s . 
-·' 'L7ll ~iOil -Ll.L.il1l:s c .:: i "t (·,j_n : '21:J1I!1. -. OJ~ C1~;,i t~ o t i Jl1 :tl8 C eGE1 '" ' l.., ~~~ or .. 
·::; h e' "'vh i.T:!: t llin::.; s vFi -1.1 co ~_lo.p s e .. 
· (10 ) Triecl.. . 
r.1e:~c_:P :~ ::.•.e , r" i s ·;·.:;_ i ',ut e :.s :,_· cT ·~~ o:i' 
=: :._~c.:d .-~: il-~ ;~~ -~ ,..~- -~8 _j ; cu:='_ .:"'.!.lJ. 
__ ._ ·v·-~ :u·i_, ·' ·· : ... ·c )-:.- ~ -· c .~-.. ~ ·1.: .. ~.: --- .. . ~ -.l ·-~: .. .J~! 
~~-~-~· __ :·· ~~ " .... :-~~ :L ~L, 5_:; u :I: il) -L:.0o .. 
C O" .l._ C:.Z.1~i 1 8-~t.c:. :C CJ l-:Gljj • 
. --1lj_:·::os(~ d. t .J . 
~i:~ :_:~~-:·;:-.~~ il12S i:f~1.l~C. 110 t c~c; t ·:,~_r ·: ~ o . r='~ : :c o-:\-1~ - c_ .. ~·.rr.._, "F;, y 't ., .- s·L 2 !"J.-
~--: l o ~,:e es efOI'G t l1e y l e f t ' 1 ~.e ~: l o.nt . 
}i1u ·tl"'_:L~e , ~ T i ·tll g ooc_ I10::.") c.l e , j;: __ ,_blic .~ ~ iJ ~~l r'l i _., -"' -0 1Jc L ... Se ~fti.. J_ 
~r: ~CO:~:L- ~::-:1 Ilo-~- -' 110 t~ ~--~ l..:_~ f\.11 . L c.lJo:t.· C-Jll~.C- - ~::. -0 .-- 1 , ~ --r- ~-t~- -:~~: -~: ·t 
' TlOi.Ld not, b e l i e v e anyt' · in3 y ou ( ;·:;_e_i>. cc;e:;::~e::,·('j ) to le: t~:e::..1. 1 • 
: ~:'._/~t. CJI' J.: '.'!it h 2. rt i :ffCi.'- :;rt 1::.::.: :'. 0 11 . 
n _ ··~ - ~ -ll-~ -.. -Ol..J_]_ "~- l.} e c l o se d. · ;_·of_~_._. : ~· .. ~i -~;-· -~--~ ~-.;_ ;o~:.. ]~ r~~ -.-~J:.~- :_r-_8-C ;: - ~J..~5_ , _ o· ·. 
:."... _y~~ -t:J.;: ·L ~-·::; ;3i. -· 2_ \ }\J ~) ~.:-·o.~_: :L··, ~-·: 
:Je f i i_ite "Jr o ~;r r.-::: ':ro ..-;. 2.. c. n o ·- · e of 2ny h•:: l :p 
-~ (!_;_~.' -~ ;;:_;-·- __ '-~·-:.; '~ -  >J :l.-~~ 1 :.·_ . 3 . (J '~ ~~J~~ l---: v=..~ : ~ . 
( ,_.:;_ . .=-es . nso::-1e com::;_:anies ·:;orked ou t :pol icy t h Dt tie d i n with 
e veryt h i n g 11 • 
nuru agement i sn't suppo sed t o g e t e v ery l as t r~r op o f 
blood ou t of "<Wr kersn . 
"'l'here i s a. b a.l anc e so::-_lev•rlle re ll . 
"So: 1ewhere, smr..ehow , someone l:!. e. s ?;ot t o be l i eve vv-h .:.t the 
other t e ll s him. " 
:O.~ f ini te c onne c t ion b e tt;r·::; oJ.'l )US i jless trends <L d l c~bor 
po ~1_ ic y 
) .. ny ot:i.1e r r l ml t s t :c il::::es e.ffect s thi s ; l an.t . 
r :e eJ:~d. .J :e J..'PG del~c..l C-over~nrlC Y~t, :;_ lt)-;_:, to ·2 2.C8 ~.i:' o:.: !"!1) .. ~"}_ :·.<= 8T1.en-c, 
L-lli Oll not c Oi~ L. :,: ollec!. the \-.~c:y ::.:.:: :o. l::--.~-::: o·..., cnt i s 
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.I I 1te · ··ievr - Continued 
I f vne epa1 twe: t c :>es not 8~...; :-c ee ·.-; i t.h co::J.tro.ct. , t~~ey ~~se 
t 1e ix• orm tlleo:cies - cit e d :E>~· stel~n T;ass achuset·cs 'Jus 
::: ·cri~~e ( June 1 :~49 ) F r st.r i 1:e !·.::c..· - 194'-
'C' .:.ion m st cc::') c~ ·':'l:..;. c: t~: is - or i t -.,- ulc!.. :i.1 c:.:::.·:::-c:::: 
FuHo.::, lJ.e t l a:: ::::otte:.1 on -e m:se i t he.s et'_~cl::: Jo O!'tt2.1 '-"-Ct . 
I'r-e ,ric-v.....: t; -:;h ~ s -y ee,r , t her e vre re co:i.1tract e. v i a'·j_ :1~ , 
.... :.J. \..~ !"-: 1"~ c1i~ficu t -. 
2Tot ? · ·1tct. i on i.1 ' ~u UJ! ·(,o i n l.' e_,_ e.tiun to c..:.,.:;~ ul' :L <.: . ~.J CJ ·- . 
n-.- u can 't ~;et so:1~t:Ul:"._:-~ ~O ::.' lJ.C; t :1il1t_;n . 
I.Tost corr1:· a~1i~:~ t::lci11::; ;::-:~41 : ·* .J.." fJ..~ (,~~ i ~~ .. ::u:_ "8fJ · .. 
Cu~ s•- this by l ooking at c s~ o ~ ~r~cuct ~ n 9 
~·d t day and w2ges i n _940 and to~ay . 
~fust CuTit ·ol l abor , "irect or i~Jirect , ad ot~er 
c os ts fen, b ::nef i t of c om:1)e.ny. 
:Eote c.stel'is~c quest ion ;.'}3 - sho vs he C'.oc;sn' t reall y 
kr101 ·,·.rlls.t a p o s itive :p:cor;run is . 
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! .. . ) \C.. 
III 
Personnel-executive force weak 
"")::' 1 {i /i ..... 
"~---=..~ 
If factury ~anager is cic~ , there is no one t r a ined to 
r e1Jl 2.c e hill . 
Ho cJDe -Gr· o. i:!:w d t o -~ a ;:e over c.ny other job. 
·Ye s 
" .il.S thii.l{;S c;c: t r ou ;_;llel ' C' YlcL l'OU(.;Il8l' , t}:'8 'JI '. !ill be 
e&sier t o liv e F'ith 11 • 
"At j)r sent tir'18 , they are ::a:tl6.ling l E,bor -... .Ji tll spur of 
tlle nom.e 1t stu:i:" f ·' .. 
Si l c e str ~_};:e YiJOre s tiffsni:ri; thon -.. ·e r:. : ;::cn~hlt; by o:.~.~._ ~ai.lY. 
';'rou l d not e :c;:t J.B_,yn • v er :1e e c1 . 
nno l o:.. g l~a:nge pl2.n'1 • 
( 3) "2'~o -L t oo ;;oodY 
Do no t get too c l ose to . theD 
~-=:: istoric f _l 'C E.c l~ · -~I"ou:nc. of lc. Jor r e l c.:t:. :'_cJns ~,·:ill t - ~:e 
<;~1..d t e c '::h:l. :_e t o cl e<..i.r f :_-- n cravJ. 
( 4) IT U u-,"8 [!.Ver C(;6 2,8 f 2 T" Q S 8.bili t y i S C 0l1C 8 -~ 118( !l 
·~u i te o. f e·w· ~ .. -c ll-t:c·c, i rl.ec :J.G~·l. 
!'.. lot ---"' thu "o:.'.n t:; nes ot t oo s~;:r~: 
I\ Oi"t) of i,i:lt~Jr L~Gl1 ,:.::tVC: h e e-.. 1ere --l~[;~- ~co ~ i .·~J1 ·t e e ~re p_:--s 
·r.:~ P. -4- tr~ l . ...... 0 Cl- ~ ......... ,:, r-. 1 ··-:o -_,J..,_ 1 n l c n ._c:--; ~~·r 
· i ~J :J Lt 0. .!.l.U ) Cl.l..~ U. C::.l ....L. ; j _ _ .....,. -.. - -........ _, _ ...._ 
;an out tric~ any GO Od time s t ud IlC.ll v 
I~110 0.1: t~ l1e ~~1-~~ ·J l: s of ·t 11e t ~.: D. ,e . 
?o l i shing 1-?.nd buff i Eg ro om c ontrol the pol itics of 
.;lant ·\:ri tl1 h s l lJ from other depar·tnents. 
Split - up i n l as t e lec t i on :cesnlted i n Ylest e r man r s e -
c on ing chi ef st mNard .. 
{ 5) 11'iJlhole local not too hot" 
Keyston e out and tlley ' r e out of Keys t one 
Damned near closed the Porter comp any 
Don't seem to be abl e to negot i ate hi s toric ally . 
Ac tion i n otll8r fe.ctori es sho•r them up. 
"Unt i l a year ago, ac t i Ye Co:mmuni st s e t-up" 
trNow, several le an , but are not real" 
Follow U.E~ policy blindly 
Also followe d C. P .. line when Timpson when he wa s here. 
(6 } "Maloney formulate s most policyn 
Pre siden t d i ctates mo s t larg e ~~o l icy · 
Ivialoney c on s ults Ra:ym.ond on big qqestion s. 
By and large Maloney makes most decisions 
Rel a tions stem f ron1 workers to f oremen in the plant 
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III 
( 7 } 
Interv i ew - Continue d 
Certainly not opposed - necessary human nature be ing 
what i t is 
Al l controls off , pay what you c an get away with 
Wi l l have mod i fie d soc i~lism after l abor gains 
politic a l powers - i s aga i ns t i t . 
"Enact l egislat ion t o control exc e sse s by both parties" 
"Taft-Har tley Law good one .- prove d out so f ar 11 
"Some AFL Unions beneficial" 
"Hate bi g government worse t han anyt.h i ng i n the worl d 11 
"Pre s ident onl y directs t hr ough viol ent means - no co-
herent policy 'stems f r om h i m" 
NAI~ does not s eem to have good .policy - would like 
l a issez-faire. 
Unions pushi ng country to socialism - NG r eal danger of 
union over t he long haul is a·t the polls. Cannot trust 
either management or union - some good un ion l eaders 
,also some good management. 
Gover maent only good arbi t r ator . 
Do not leave to management - not disinterested enough 
Same vd t h labor. 
(8} Up to a point execut i ves do, after t hat president does. 
(9} No - none what so ever 
(10) 
Definite l ack. Does not exist as a pol i cy 
''Have been poundi ng them over t he he ad" 
Will intensify the annoyanc e if you aren't dec ent 
about t hings. 
(11} Learn by doing - enlightened program 
nuse personnel department mor e t han we do" 
"Foremen sometimes aren't even backed u p by the company" 
"All labor relat i ons should be settled in the plant" · 
"By the t ime it gets to personnel it is close to unsolv-
able" 
Foreman r e spons ibilities should be broadened. 
Vvhen he acts as a leader of men, t h i ngs are better. 
Very important that the f oremen know company policy ~ 
believe in it" 
(12) No - still have to have the men to carry out the policy. 
Still impr ove with what t hey have. 
Should be l ivi ng .embodiment of policy. 
Improving PR 
Pr etty har d to do 
Factory manager's job more or less l abor relat ions 
progr am 
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III Interview - Continued 
Foremen not l abor r elations conscious but could be 
trained 
Foremen should control men in o~m department 
Old ide a of foremen good - should act as le ader of men. 
Foremen level is best for L~ R. pol i cy 
Would have to be trained vvell. 
"Got to educ at e them" 
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IV . Interviewed dune 28, 1949 
(1) Diversification of products 
Expansion of sales force to take care of it 
( 2} No difference in ovm policies 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
( 6} 
Labor in general wants maximUL1 pay for minimum effort 
No re ason to change 
No-wages-present union 
Comes through personnel - as far as poss ible 
Foreman straightens out the problem - ideal condition 
for handling labor problem 
Try to hold within shop level 
Good-doing better than before 
Earning rate is same - output higher 
Top men in un i on all right 
It's the human element in local 
No difference in unions 
Favor CIO, ·more cooperative in labor inc entive 
957~ of the men not interested in Com.':llunists 
President of t he compcmy generally det ermines labor policy 
( 7} npm ~ liberal mysel:e" 
Came up the hard way · 
Unions have done a big service to the average worker 
Expects reasonable effort for reasonable pay 
In 1 930, he was for 1-ffiA and. minimum wage 
(8) President determines overall policy 
Directors help to some extent 
(9) Don't belieye we have it 
No formal program 
Haven't done very much with it 
Have given good pict.ure and information to the stock-
holders. 
(11} Should make some effort 
Example of Wilson Machine Foundry sending questionnaire 
to worker:s 
Open house program - might do some good 
~e stionable benef it - may get better relations with 
employees and employers. 
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IV Interview - Continued 
Not thoroughly convi nced fenc es can be broken 
Mutual distrust here - workers prone to believe manage-
ment always malring money 
Best type labor relations built up by mutual financial 
arrangements 
Agrees to a long range plan - sees necessity and value 
thereof 
Lincoln Electric, Cleveland - incentive system 
Started in 1910 to build good labor relations 
Incentive program tood seven - eight years to get any 
tangible results 
(12) Good. By means of paper, support of t eams 
Bowling, softball 
Have done somethi ng on this 
Doesn't favor bulletin boards except for announcements 
Workers resent propaganda on bulletin boards 
A community relations program would help and be a good 
t h i ng 
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V Interviewed dUly 1, 1949 
(1} Development of new items in present line of manufacture. 
(2) Will affect policy during depression unless government 
established minimum way and minimum work week - should 
be about 24 - 30 hours 
And a depression is coming 
( 3) Take tremendous strides - last ye ar through Labor-Ivianage-
ment Meeting 
Labor has shown an aptitude f or cooperation in last six 
mont hs which t wo ye ars ago was not poss·ible 
Are approaching good modern ideas in methods be ing used 
now 
(4) Very good - above average 
dUSt as good as any plant he has ever s een 
Could have a little more cooperation 
Techniques are advancing in ideas of manufacture 
(5) Eliminating radicals very fast 
Should classify workers into trade skil l s 
Step into c ategory of A. F. of L. 
(6) Should be personnel 
Is President actually 
(7) Fine 
Nat i onal in scope 
Doe sn't hurt anybody if the union .s ets up . a uniform 
policy country wide 
( 8 ) Pre s i dent of company does 
Executive subservient "90%" to President . 
(9) No, but there is a necessity for one 
(11) "I do" 
Yes. Thinks more you tell about the business, t he better 
off they would be •••••• the employees, that is. 
Give them all the dope 
Very few men who \YOrk for a living do not know cost. 
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VI Interviewed June 29, 1949 
(1) Organization nevery phase have a good going over to fit 
them for present day condition" 
Sales - asleep 
Purchas ing department - used to place orders wherever 
they could 
Manufacturing department - produced quality that could 
scarcely get by under competition 
(2) No corili~ent - not in a position to answer 
(3) Mediocre too poor 
Coming as he has from G.E. 
Some cornnunications although not much from what he has 
seen 
Claims he is not really qualified to answer 
No conscious effort to explain things - may not have the 
money 
( 4) Average 
{5) If he were a man in the plant, he wouldn't pick U.E. 
Repre sentation not too alert to the needs of the workers . 
Could be better served - perhaps by an independent union 
Voice of union not too responsible to member 
Qual ification: not too close to labor situation 
(6) Pres i dent and directors 
(7) Fine - except ot her countrie s ahead of us i n uni on re spon-
sibility 
"Somethines they're childish tt 
(8 ) Follm"lS suggest i ons by department heads 
"Bas i cally set a lit t l e belov.,r h is leve l and he puts 
s eal of approval" 
"There is a proposal stege y,r::ich he honors" 
9 ) ~o Outs ide of Labor re l at i ons n~) orc.:;.::.ni zed pl o.n f or such 
act ivities 
No community relations 
Fe els the need for one in every Dusiness 
No conscious effort as in G.E. 
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VI Interview - Continued 
(11) Combine employee end COIDL1unity relations 
Doesn't think company could af:fort a progreJn 
Put such a program under one hEad 
I nvolves newspaper advertising, i nformation to the 
citizens about a ims-, etc. of tie company 
Company could not offer as intEnsive a progr8111 a s G.E. 
Progr eJJl would have to be tones down in a competitive 
market. This company in a particularly competitive 
marl<:et. 
(12) As anactivity by itself you couldn't justify it. 
Could be a plan - s hould be a r:lan here. 
Perhaps as a part of personnel off ice. 
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VII Interviewed August ~ 1949 
(l) Lack of good understanding between labor and management 
A sense of understanding 
The labor question 
Sincerity of management 
Lack of faith seems to hurt 
If we could break this barrier, labor relations would 
be 50% better at least 
(2) Lack of business tends to undermine worker himself 
with the thought of lack of security. 
Worker tries to string 1llhat there is out. Matter of 
self, family protection. 
This is bad, makes for mess ing schedules and the company 
must meet price and competition. 
(3) Fairly good in this plant. 
~uite an Lmprovement in past year. Get together fairly 
well now. 
(5) Stewards are poor. 
Not e ducated enough to handle men and problems. 
Stewards have no sense of discipline. 
Lack of strength shown be ste'Nards is bad • 
.Just loose ends. Stewards use ovm judgement which is 
usually not good. 
Cannot r each agre ement with Stewards. It is their way 
or not at all. 
Blame everything on lack of leadership. 
They seem to want to keep things in a st ate of upheaval. 
(6) Ways and me ans committee, not by any one man . 
(7) Unions are good if the guiding light is strong and fruir-
minded. 
They can be a big help. 
Stewards should be appointed, not elected. Thi s would 
ge t bet ter men for the job. 
(8) Generally "I" do, outside of adopted policy by Ways and 
Means Committee. 
(9) There isn 't too much of that i n t his company . 
Fairly good. Have policy of seeing that representative s 
contac t customers as often a s pos sible. 
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VII I nterview - Continued 
(10) Have had a number of foremen 's meet ings to teach 
them to train new people. I ntroduce t hem around. 
Show them about . Show some degree of interest in 
them. 
Still much i mprovement . t o be made . It is a matter 
of training . 
(11) Budget at the present t i me adequate . 
Company newspaper could be helpful , if properly 
edited . 
Can't accomplish our goal s under the present set up . 
Have to have change in Stewar ds .. 
Believe v;rholeheartedly i n a company tra ining progra.m . 
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VIII I nt erviewe C!._ A\!:£..1..!.~-~ 1 949 
( 1) Reaching a better underst anding vli t h l a or . 
(2) Ye s, definitely, uni.on labor just getting over wa:r-
time honeymoon psychology. Management also. 
Has been and still is problem to educate labor. 
(3) No company newspaper. 
Bulletin boards and unfortunately word of mouth as well 
as notices mailed to employee s home addressed to employee 
and family. 
-( 4) If treated fairly and vvi th no union to distort what was · 
fair treatment vmuld be 0 . K. 
(5) Loc al U.E. are extremists in every f orm of labor rela-
tions. 
Direct result of he ads of national. 
FuLLy in ac cord wi th U .E. by-laws. Same as C. I. 0. word-
ing intent very democrat ic. 
(6) No singl e person • 
. d . C. Raymond has final say , s eldom exercised except 
during negotiations. 
Trust placed on Maloney. 
N . C. Raymond· ha s confi cienc e in the Pers one l Department -
c onsi ders the ir i de as . 
( ? ) Origi nal theore t i c al i~ten~ i s excellent . All gr oups 
shoul d e repre sent ed. 
M<:my i nst"' nc e s unions become monsters that can ' t be 
controlled . 
1vialce s dopes of Amer i c E",n pe opl e vrho ar e not .; e t tine; t rue 
r epresent at ion . 
( 8 ) Ten year s ago I'!Jl" . ~a:ynonc1 , not t he T.Iay s c__ C l\1[.3an .~: Com-
~ li t t ee . 
( 9 No f or D;2l PulJlic ue l atio11 s pol icy or pro s rmn. 
Policy toward workers - fair days pay for fair days work. 
As far a s outside - no .·wish to glamorize nor. g ive 
i mpression of sweat shop or country club. 
(11) Need different union than U.E. 
Ne ed t emperately minded union wiJ_ling to fight for 
workers rights on issues that deserve attention not 
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VIII I nter view - Continued 
Fetty ones. 
(12) Decidedly, absolutely. 
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IX Interviewed August 3J_l 949 
(1) Business, more business. 
(2) Yes, will be better. .As long as business is down there 
is less trouble with labor. 
Labor goes after something when they think they can 
get it. 
' (3) lOO~b better than it was s. year 'ago. 
Now goes up as well as dovm. 
War time advances. 
Result of strike last year when labor asked for t oo 
much - and lost. 
(4) Skilled labor has dropped off considerably. 
Unions are making it tough f<;>r trade schools. 
Notnng wTong with our people. 
(5) Strictly Cow~unist dominated union - local same 
proof slowdov.ms. 
(6) Set up by Superintendent and Personnel Department. 
Run by Personnel. 
( 7) l•Kanagement and l abor is going to get closer together. 
:More possible through A. F. of L. 
Hat her have good union than none. 
A good union would help company. 
(8 ) "I" control 90% ~f policy. 
( <;?) Not as much as we vva.nt to have in the :future. 
(11} Get Communists out of the union is first step in getting 
a good public relations policy i nto eff ect. 
(12) Yes. 
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PERSOlTI~£L Al~D LABOR RELATIONS DIRECTOR 
Informal conversation -
Believes that the labor leaders are to blame for · 
non-cooperation rather than the rank and file. 
ncan't do business with people who are always 
looking for more no matter what you g ive them." 
U.E.W. technique to capture and organize a plant 
by the divide and conquer technique. 
Director's story: 
It was a hot day. 
The chief steward c alled. 
The men want ed to quit at 11:00 A. M. 
Director said no. 
Steward said he'd make a dee~ - 2:00 P.M. maybe 
Director said no. 
Steward then hinted abo~t production for that 
day. 
Conclusion: Slowdown chief weapon, n~to strike, 
for enforcing uni on demands. · 
Wage increase has been :l-2% above 1939. 
Hunt-Spiller average length of service: 
A.S.Campbell average length of service: 
? 
10 years 
4.5 years 
"Couldn't get quality, couldn't get production for 
wages paid out.n 
Company going broket Why? Slowdownst 
"War-babies" shirkers. Old-t imers do a good day's work. 
Right labor union can be an asset. 
Wants a working-man leac1er shlp . 
Under w~. Campbell, contracts weren't written. 
Workers bartered :piecie work rates. 
Paid prevailing wages. 
Had loyalty and frieddship of his help. 
Campbell was paternalistic type of employer but good. 
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ASSISTMfT FERSO~ThffiL DIRECTOR 
Infor mal conversation ~ 
Feels that slowdovm was one of t he most i mportant 
problems. 
"Men fear anything new." 
"Never been a country club -never been a sweat shop ." 
Believes father is not as "alert to conditions as 
he should be". 
Agrees to the principle of the labor movement. 
Does not agre e with the practice of top labor l eaders. 
Believes men would slowdown even if there were no 
union in the plant • . They would walk out, t ake long 
lunch periods , go out to smoke, etc. 
Reasons for no employee journal or paper - no person-
nel, no budget. 
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P ILOT QUES'ri Ol":"S :B'UR LABOR IliTERVIE\iiJS 
No . 1 
GENER.P._L BACKGROUND: 
How long wi t h the un i on? 
What is your job? 
wha,t di d you do before you came here? 
What is your educational bacl~ground? 
(1) What do you think the company could do to solve 
the Labor management problems in the pl ant ? 
(2) In light of possible future business conditions , 
what do you think the unions stand will be? 
(3) In view of recent accusations c oncerning Com-
munism in the union, what are your opinions on 
the subject? 
(4) Do you think that the company can ever reach an 
understanding with the union? 
(5) Can you comment on the internal dissension in 
the U.E.? 
{6) How do you think the labor force is reacting to 
this dissension? 
(?) What are your present relations with the company? 
(8) Who sets policy at A. S. Campbell Company? 
( 9) Have relations with the company always been the 
same? 
(10) What will be the most important issue facing 
labor and the c ompany in the near future? 
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PILOT 9cUESTIONS FOR LABOR I NTERVIEWS 
No. 2 
GENERAL BACKGROUND: 
How long with the union? 
What is your job? 
What did you do before you crune here? 
What is your educational background? 
(1) Who determines Company policy? 
(2) Who determines union policy? 
(3) Do you think the company understands your 
needs? 
(4) Does the union represent the individual --
you? 
(5) Do you think the U.E. is a democratic un i on? 
Why? 
(6) What do you think of the Corn..munist charge s 
that are being throvm at t he U.E.? 
{7) Do you think business conditions today affect 
your job? 
(8 ) Would you discuss the past relations of t he 
company with the e!:lployees? 
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INTERVIEWS WI'l"'I1 UNI ON PERSONNEL 
Person A - Interviewed August 2, 1949 
(1) They could train some of their supervisors they have 
had for a number o~ years in human and labor relations. 
They do many things wrong. DisrEgard features of the 
contract, etc. This holds from Plant supervisor do~~ 
with few exceptions. It is the personalities involved 
and they can't be changed. They use the s ame approach 
now as fifteen year$ ago. 
(2) This local hopes to be as .militant with sound degree 
of common sense. Of course cannot speak for U.E. 
national. 
(3 ) Communist t a lk not hel p ing the union at all. Employers 
use Red Baiting for t heir advantage. Workers are be-
ginning to r ealize this. 
(4) They c an reach an understanding if they have a desire 
to. Employer and employee should work to keep con-
tract. Make a few corrections in the people they have 
working for them. 
(5) Internal fi r ht bein2 recognized as a help to the bosses. 
Men seeing Red Baiting as help to bosses. 
All . policies are set up by delegates at convent.ion. 
( 6 ) Rank and file emotions in Red Baiting more important 
than resentment to le aders. 
( 7) 1'hey have got to live with it and not break contract. 
With inconsistent policy management will never get on 
with the union. 
( 13 ) Who sets policy? Do not think any one sets policy at 
Company. Confused. 
(9) Labor-management relat ions have improved in t he last 
ten months due to new contract. Some management have 
attempted to cooperate. 
(10) Next contract. Ma jor issue hourly wage guarantee. 
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Person B - Interviewed August 2, 1949. 
Has been with the company ? years. 
j (1) Board of directors determines the policy for this 
t, COI!lj? a.ny • 
(2) The raruc and file in our union determines policy. 
(3 ) No. They feel we are biased and prejudiced, determined 
to beat the company. We are only pi.icing the contract, 
not running t he pl ant. 
(4) Definitely, the individual is always represented. 
(5} "To my knowledge probably the only international union 
in the United States or Canada whose policies are 
dict a ted by the rank and f i le members. " 
(6) Kick the Commies out. There are t wo types and they 
ar e both bad. 
(?) Do not believe that t here is a recession nor a depres-
sion. There will hot be a depr e ssion for a while. 
Last ye ar or two speedups have lcept production at war 
level. Cut back in employment. 
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Person C - Interviewed August 2, 1949 
Has been with the company 12 years 
{1) Personnel 
(2) Shop Committee 
{3) Sometimes they do, sometimes they don't. 
{4) Yes 
(5) I think so. It has done a lot for the workers 
since in. 
( 6) Red Baiting 
(?) Has shovm s ome effect. There were lay-offs 
in M.ay and April. 
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Person D - Interviewed August 2, 1949 
Has been with the comp any 4 years 
(1) Plant manager 
(2) Rank & file 
(3) As a whole some do, some don't. What you need, 
what they give you, two different things. 
(4) Yes 
(5) Yes, very democrat ic. Elected offic ers follow 
peoples wishes. 
(6) As long as they don't try to talk t o us, OE. Just 
stick to plant problems. What happens in plant is 
what we are interested in. 
(7) If cost of living goes down, wages go dovvn . 
l 
91 
Person E - Interviewed August 2, 1949 
Has been with the company 10 years 
(1) Hugh Johnstone 
(2) Ru s ty Hannig an 
( 3) No 
(4) Yes t hey do 
(5) Ye s from what he reads. They do the best t hey 
can f or the worker . 
(6) So far there isn't. 
(7) Don't t h i i-lk so. Getting top p ay now. Won't 
ge t what they are i n a Depression. 
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( i) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
( 6) 
( 7) 
Person F' - Interviewed August 2, 1949 
Has been with the company 8 years. 
N. c. Raymond and Hugh Johnstone 
Rusty Hanni .gan sets standard. Westerman has 
some say.' Divided factions in U.E. on national 
level. Fitzgerald Pres . 
·This paxticular company doesn't. 
As far as pos s ible they do. 
·• 
Yes. Elect own ste·wards. Steward in each 
depE.rtment. Any steward can t alk to any 
higher official. 
Know a few who are cow~unists. Some leaders are. 
Do not know Matles and Emspak well enough to say. 
Do not think they are. Does not think it bad for 
Communists on top running things. 
Working harder for less pay now. Union has lost · 
power here because of the T-H Law. Not· much . 
r e s ent ment here. 80% for, 20% against . 
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Person G - Interviewed August 2, 1949 
Has been with the company 8 yee~s 
(1) President 
(2) Rank & file 
( 3 ) No, not on 100% basis. 
(4) Definitely. 
(5) Yes , no question, majority rules. 
( 6) Cormnunist el'Erges from Taft-Hartley Law affidavits 
wh ich are to be signed. If they were Cor,nnunists -
rebellion. 
(7) Even with decline in business are working 50 hour 
week . Rest of company is p ick i ng up too. 
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Person H - Interviewed August 2 , 1 949 
Has been with the company 3 years 
(1) Maloney 
(2) Chief Steward. Husty Hannigan at meetings. 
(3) Guess they do - they should. 
(4) Yes , the union is supposed to represent us. 
(5) No trouble personally. Never did anything 
viTone , as far a s I can see. 
{6) Don't see any here . If there are any it is b a d. 
(7) Yes it does . Spe ed up probably. 
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Person I - IntervievJed August 2 , 1949 
Ha.s been viith the company 10 years 
(1) Big official s. Between Personnel Director 
and Pre s ident. 
( 2 ) Com.rni ttee, officers, and Bus i ness Agent . 
(3 } Somet:ines they do, somet i mes they don ' t. 
Lately they d i sa~re e . 
(4) Yes , we represent all under bargaining unit. 
(5} Locally yes -rank and f ile r epresentation. 
Don't lu1ow about District or International. 
(6) Charge s could hurt us in lots of ways. Would 
hurt organi zation a lot if they are Cor~munists. 
(7) Depression wi ll hurt everyone. 
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Person J" - Interviewed August 2, 1949 
Has b e en with the company 9 years 
(1} President N . C. Raymond 
(2) Rank & file. 
(3) Sometimes . Very cooperat ive in t his depart ment . 
(4) Yes, they fight to the be s t of its ability. 
{5} Yes, people have something to say about it. 
( 6) Don't kn )Vv anyth ing about big fellows . Fellow 
workers not commies. 
(7) No affect yet. It probably will. Union wi ll try 
hard t o keep wage scal e up. If they cut wages 
they should cut cost of living . 
(8) It was roug h going b efore. The pay sc a l e i s a s 
good as any place . The union made them do better . 
As far as the f oremen are concerned some cooperate, 
some don't. Management is still working 20 years 
back . 
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Person K - Interviewed August 3, 1949 
Has been with the company 12 ye ars 
( 1) N. C. rt'aymond, Maloney and Hugh Johnstone. 
(2) On local level business agent, committee, and 
chief steward make plans then submit them to 
the ranlc and file. 
( 3) Company lcnows what next person needs. :Management 
tries to hold vvorker back for a better grip on them. 
(4) Yes, in the plant. 
(5) Yes, -believe so, we elect our ovm offic ers. 
People can voice our own opinion. 
(6) Boils down to one or two men. U.E. itself has 
done a pretty good job in the pl ant. · Cornnunists 
i n this pl ant v.rould get throvm out. 
· (7) Business slowing dmvn affects man vdth low 
seniority . We have be en pushe d harder for 
smne or le s s pay. 
( 8 ) Have s een company come a long way sinc e they J)aid 
25¢ an hour. The un i on has he lped get ever yth i ng . 
I t h ink t hat union and management coul d come t o 
an agr eement. 
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( l ) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4 ) 
( 5) 
( 6 ) 
Person L - I nterviewed August. 3 , 1 949 
Has be en vd th the company 11 ye ars 
Bo ard of Directors 
People themselves hare at t he pl ant 
ITo , not interested . They do not vJa.nt to . 
Somet i mes. 
No . Vias a delegate at the Ohio c onvention in 
1941. The r anlc and file t here didn ' t . h·ave a 
chance . The offic ers controlled ev~rything . 
There 8.re Conunies in t he union . Matles and 
Emspak - questi onable pro.bably are . I n· Oh i o 
in 1941 heard Fitzger al d say somethine like 
this, u • •• • • if Communism will e,ive us what we 
want, I' 11 go ~" lon,.:o vd th .. it . 11 
(?) N ~ t I d~ubt J."f J."t ·~J.·l_l . o, no 1.; as ye • ,_ ., 
(8 ) Past relations were v ary bad . It is getting 
bet ~~ er. Company is antagonistic - t ake what 
we g ive . 
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Person M. - I n t erviewe d August 4, 1 949 
Has be en with the company 13 year s 
( 1) 1 • C . RaJi:J.ond. 
( 2 ) The "Body" - the ran_;: & file- . 
( 3 ) If mEnJ.agement would s top nnd t:':l idc about me -
they could understand. On t h e VT. ol e d o not 
thi:::> that : nn e.semen t would think of my we l are . 
( 4 ) Th iPlc t '1.ey do . 
( 5 ) Ye s . They hold yearly e l ections .. Vote on 
things a.s t 18Y c or"le v.p .. 
No f u ·ther c_;:ur;:e:rs 
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( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
Person N - Interviewed August 4, 1949 
Has been with the company for over 
a two year period. 
General manager. Paine - Chairmen of the Boa rd of 
Directors. 
Heads of International. Peculiarities of each 
plant taken into account. Democratic, unlimited 
say by the rank and file. 
No, never have shown interest in the matter. 
Never any personal interviews. 
Yes, the union represents the individual. 
National convention very democratic . 
~ o further answers. 
~-~ 
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